

THE NEW REPUBLIC

Breaking Up CIA - II

In his Executive Order of February 19 doing away with the Operations Coordinating Board, the President explained that this administrative invention of the Eisenhower years "had been used for work which we now plan to do in other ways. . . . First, we will center responsibility for much of the Board's work in the Secretary of State. He expects to rely particularly on the Assistant Secretaries in charge of regional bureaus, and they in turn will consult closely with other departments and agencies. This will be our ordinary rule for continuing coordination of our work in relation to a country or area." More recently, Mr. Kennedy has reiterated his intention to restore primacy in the formulation of foreign policy to the State Department. He has sent personal letters to all US Ambassadors, reminding them that they are to have the last word among US representatives in their jurisdiction. ("We expect our ambassadors abroad to take charge of the relations of the United States with the country in which they are posted," said Dean Rusk in a speech last week at the Foreign Service Institute, "and if necessary to take charge of all the officials who are there working with them.") The President's reminder may have to be driven home in the months ahead. For in country after country, the commanding officer of the Military Assistance Advisory Group and the principal operative of the Central Intelligence Agency have grown accustomed to acting, often in concert, as if they had the authority of an Ambassador. Many a MAAG mission chief or CIA agent has made dubious commitments with unpopular local military figures or ruling groups. Laos is a prime case in point. And this diffusion of authority in the field has reflected a similar diffusion in Washington. To re-establish order and discipline in the planning and execution of foreign policy, the

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from
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What's a Debt?

★ When your conservative friend next complains about the federal debt ask him if he means "gross" or "net" debt? While he is reeling tell him that there is a \$50 billion difference. If he calls this arrant nonsense, cite the US Commerce Department figure of *net* federal public debt - \$241 billion, as against the *gross* debt estimate just used by Congress in raising the debt ceiling - \$290 billion. If you are still on speaking terms wind up by telling him that net federal public debt is now *less* than it was in 1945 and gross debt is not very much bigger.

The fact is the biggest phony in Washington is the bugbear of the federal debt. For years the scarecrow of its immensity has frightened timid Congressmen from every necessary social reform accepted in other modern countries. It is harder to understand because fiscal agencies here have their rival figures of the debt. The arbitrary "gross" figure includes billions set aside for trust funds, like social security which the government owes to itself. They are debts only in the sense that money advanced by a parent corporation to a wholly owned subsidiary is a debt.

But for the purpose of argument let's take the gross debt figure, social security fund and all. Right after the war it stood at \$279 billion; today it's around \$290 billion including the trust fund obligations. That's an increase of around 12 percent. Does that frighten you? In the same period corporate debt has risen 300 percent; state and local debt by 400 percent; individual debt by 450 percent!

All the time federal debt has inched forward population has galloped. The

debt burden on the individual was \$1,832 in 1946; in May, 1961, it was down to \$1,583. National output has jumped, too. The debt seemed gigantic right after the war - it was bigger than one year's national product: the ratio was 117 percent. But today the ratio is down to 58 percent.

The plain fact is Washington has shirked burdens which it ought to have assumed. Particularly it has shunted expenses off onto state and local governments. They are up to their necks in IOU's. Schools are the best example. It's time the federal government stepped in.

A new President soon stamps his personality on federal regulatory agencies - commissions with authority over fuel, power, transport, communications, Wall Street, and the like. A case in point is the 5-man Power Commission. This decides what rates we pay for oil and natural gas. Kennedy found it in chaos, dragging its heels against two Supreme Court decisions in the consumers' interest. Two first-rate new Kennedy commissioners have now been confirmed, Joseph Swidler, former TVA general counsel (headed for the chairmanship if Eisenhower hold-over Kuykendall can be ousted) and Howard Morgan, Oregon's one-man utility commissioner called by Sen. Paul Douglas an "incorruptible champion of the consuming public," and by GOP hatchetman Sen. Scott of Pennsylvania "a liar and a perjurer." A third vacancy occurs June 22.

Everybody but the public knows how important these power commissioners are. They are arbiters in immensely technical public versus private rate-making battles involving billions. In former days Leland Olds, Tom Buchanan and other pro-consumer commissioners were reviled as Howard Morgan is now. Petty and trivial matters were raised against Morgan, who was nevertheless confirmed, 52-27, with 26 Republicans voting against him. Few things Kennedy does will be more important than modernizing these Eisenhower-stacked commissions.

Ganging Up On Minow

★ If you think we exaggerate the pressures on strong pro-public regulatory commissions note what the TV lobby

did last week to Kennedy's new chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, Newton Minow. He denounced TV-radio programs as a "wasteland." It was a magnificent speech but he shouldn't have spoken. It was almost a classic example of a powerful lobby at work; just about what you'd expect where the public's channels are handed over for private exploitation. Every Congressman wants broadcasting favors. The lobby quietly pressured Congress; the House defeated the reorganization plan, 323 to 77. Next time you switch a crime-horror program off TV in disgust just remember humbly that CBS, NBC and ABC know what is good for you; all you do is to own the channels.

The Good Judge Wright

★ Speaking of appointments, there's a vacancy in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and Kennedy is considering naming US Circuit Judge James Skelly Wright of New Orleans. Louisiana Senator Long threatens to term the choice "personally obnoxious," a formula normally amounting to veto under Senatorial courtesy. And who is Judge Wright? He handed down the splendid decisions in the New Orleans school desegregation crisis where he handled himself with courage and style. With fine timing, Yale just gave Wright an honorary LL.D. to the biggest ovation of the day.

Notes

★ Our spies tell us that General Eisenhower is getting bored at Gettysburg and is looking around for a Crusade; the one he's picked is holy war against federal deficit spending. . . . We understand that Secretary Goldberg has served quiet notice on the Senate that Kennedy will veto the House-passed bill to continue importing Mexican labor unless it includes more safeguards for US workers; the 2-year law expires automatically unless renewed. . . . We won't deride the pretentious new \$1.2 million, name-studded report on "Money & Credit" just because members conflicted and recommendations are vague; its basic signpost is toward a more centralized direction of the economy, and that is true, important and inevitable.

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Breaking Up CIA - II

President must now deal with what are two quite different problems. The problem of the relation between military and civil power is a perennial one: it is bigger today because the defense establishment has grown so big. The solution, as always, lies in the forceful exercise of leadership by the President and his Secretary of State. This is not a problem of institutional reorganization. But the rise of the CIA presents a new and unprecedented dilemma. Here Mr. Kennedy faces an historic test. He must decide what to do with a bureaucratic edifice that has been permitted to rival the State Department in influence and resources, and which literally stands in the way of ordered, responsible policy planning.

The postwar history of the growth of our intelligence services shows that to a considerable extent the State Department brought this on itself. In the debate which flared in Washington from 1945 to 1947 on how postwar intelligence activities should be set up, there were many who thought that State as the responsible agency in the foreign field should direct the new central intelligence coordinating office which, it was widely agreed, would be needed as a supplementary weapon in the Cold War. Though the armed forces killed the idea (a compromise took form in the Central Intelligence Group, precursor of CIA) a special Budget Bureau task force did succeed in persuading President Truman that intelligence research and analysis should be centered in the State Department. In a report submitted to the President on June 21, 1945, the Bureau stressed the fundamental principle that intelligence activities "should be organized at the point where decision is made or action taken." The Department, however, was not ready even for this limited function - let alone the more ambitious coordinating duties which others wanted it to assume.

When President Truman lodged the personnel of the wartime Office of Strategic Services within the Department on the recommendation of the Budget Bureau, they were suffered as unwelcome intruders by the Foreign Service. Sherman Kent, who had been in the OSS and was to become chairman of CIA's powerful Board of National Estimates (which prepares the Agency's final judgments on the capabilities of other countries for the National Security Council), has described what happened. "Among the conservative element of the Department," he wrote in 1949, "which was also the regnant element, there was little or no comprehension of what intelligence was and no disposition to support an intelligence staff." Secretary Byrnes was prevailed upon to break up the inherited organization and disperse its staff throughout the Department on the argument of the Foreign Service that "they already had an intelligence organization in that they themselves were

all intelligence officers. They therefore did not need – nor indeed did they want – an organization which might reach conclusions different from their own.” Though the intelligence unit was re-established as a separate entity by Secretary Marshall and has since remained intact, the Department hierarchs have damned it with faint praise in appropriations hearings and Congress has taken the hint in allocating budget cuts.

In retrospect it is clear how unprepared the Foreign Service was for policy leadership in the radically altered postwar world. It was a rare FSO in prewar days who thought it his business to know many people out of power in the host country, or even officials of lesser rank; who had a specialized interest in the society and politics of the country and, consequently, was disposed to think in terms of what might happen in months or years ahead. The new CIA moved into a vacuum when it made the transition from a mere coordinating agency to one carrying on its own proliferating independent functions – the functions not only of clandestine political action (paying off an opportunistic editor, or supporting a friendly student movement) and of covert intelligence-gathering (through secret agents, as against public sources) but also of collating overt information and conducting specialized research and analysis upon which policy recommendations could be based. There was nothing to discourage empire-building in the language of the National Security Act of 1947, which spoke of the “additional services” and “other functions,” over and above coordination, that the CIA might have to perform. And the powerful alliance of John Foster Dulles at State and Allen Dulles at CIA did nothing to slow down CIA’s growth. In effect, the CIA was Foster Dulles’ auxiliary Foreign Service. The State Department had few champions (this was also the McCarthy era), while the CIA hired an estimated 10,000 employees. With vast unmonitored resources – at least double those of State – the CIA was able to set up “cover” for a seemingly inexhaustible supply of agents throughout the world by offering to let the short-handed Department use them part time. In some Embassies, the CIA outnumbered the Foreign Service!

The CIA As Arbiter

“There never has been a time in history, to my knowledge,” said Allen W. Dulles in a speech at the Yale Conference on Human Resources on February 3, 1958, “when Intelligence has had as clear an opportunity to get its views over as it has had in this country in recent years. The National Security Act of 1947, creating a Central Intelligence Agency, has given Intelligence a more influential position in our government than Intelligence enjoys in any other in the world.”

The thought of a publicly-identified director oper-

ating from a highly conspicuous \$50 million headquarters and going about making speeches astounds the British, who, in their discreet MI-6, have one of the world’s quietest intelligence services. The head of MI-6 (whoever he is) reports to a deputy undersecretary in the Foreign Office; and to remove all doubt about where authority lies, his agency is said to be subject to Foreign Office personnel and audit controls. By contrast, not only does the Director of Central Intelligence sit on the National Security Council, he has direct personal access to the President equal to that of the Secretary of State. In addition, on NSC committees and other interdepartmental policy planning groups it is often the CIA representatives – holding assured tenure and, it should be said, often armed with sophisticated conceptions of strategy – who are able to arbitrate if not frankly dominate the discussion.

In its 1945 report to President Truman, the Budget Bureau had argued that a central, coordinating agency could be kept from getting out of hand. “It is a conclusion of this study that central facilities are necessary to provide the intelligence needed at the top of the government,” said the report. “It is a further conclusion, however, that the central staff required to provide such intelligence can be small, since it will rely very largely on the product of research and analysis in the departments and will not engage in large-scale original research and analysis itself.” (Italics added.) The Bureau specifically contested the view that “some such large-scale central operation as exists now in the OSS” should be continued, maintaining that it would be unsound to have “a complete structure superimposed on top of the normal structure of government beyond the period when our war needs demand it.” A somewhat less sanguine view was taken by Sherman Kent in his 1949 book, *Strategic Intelligence*. He felt it necessary to emphasize “one high overriding principle – the CIA should *stay out of primary substantive work*.” (Mr. Kent’s italics.) “As soon as [CIA] goes into substantive work,” he warned, “and itself makes descriptive or evaluative studies, it is in trouble.” Mr. Kent subsequently was recruited by CIA to preside over its evaluative work as chairman of the Board of National Estimates, with its large subordinate organization, the Office of National Estimates.

In our view a central intelligence agency which combines under one administrative head both open and hidden operations and then undertakes, in addition, policy-focused research and analysis cannot as a practical matter be kept in hand. One step in the process of breaking up the existing CIA structure – the relocation of responsibility for para-military operations such as the Cuban landing (how can you hide an invasion?) – appears to have been more or less decided upon, though not whether the responsibility for such operations

should lie in the Pentagon. The next logical step would seem to be the detachment of the rest of its above-ground activities and the creation as a successor to CIA itself of a super-secret (and officially nonexistent) agency for espionage and underground political maneuver. This new strategic services agency should be made answerable in its day-to-day operations to the Secretary of State (as in the British case) and yet might be given a degree of administrative autonomy. An alternative arrangement has been suggested by Harry Howe Ransom of the Harvard Defense Studies Program (author of *Central Intelligence and National Security*) in a discussion with this journal – a National Security Council supervisory committee to oversee secret operations, accountable to the President but with the Secretary of State as chairman. The dilemma here is that the White House and the Department of State, while controlling secret operations, must appear clean of any complicity in the “dirty business.”

In the Service of Planning

It was the anxiety to avoid identifying covert operations with the Department of State that apparently tipped the scales when the armed services waged its successful battle in 1945 against letting State have control of intelligence. Then, as now, the anxiety was warranted. But the gathering and analysis of *overt* information is a different matter and should not be confused with the mission of a strategic services agency.

The objective in relocating the overt research and analysis activities of CIA should be to place them at the service of a more effectively integrated foreign policy planning effort. This suggests that in place of their present divorce from policy planning and often pointless encyclopedic accumulation of facts, future research and analysis should be carried on with an eye to possible alternative courses of action. It suggests that most existing research and analysis work – notably the CIA's Office of National Estimates and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence Research – might be consolidated in a new National Policy Research Center, administratively separate from the State Department but operationally responsible to the appropriate regional Assistant Secretaries. (The new centralized set-up could be placed in the Department proper, but while the policy researchers should be required to coordinate their work with the corresponding policy officers in State, they should probably not have to depend for their job security or promotions on anyone there, lest they tailor their judgments to their careers.) It suggests, in sum, a clean break with the bureaucratic patterns of the past. Merely changing the name and some faces in CIA and tightening up the lines between the Agency and the State Department is not going to be enough.

Resuming Tests

There is an absence of candor in the recommendation of the Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, Rep. Chet Holifield, that the US immediately resume atomic testing for peaceful purposes and “get in readiness to resume underground weapons tests,” while at the same time continuing to talk with the Russians at Geneva about a test ban. The talks would end promptly, if his recommendation were followed – and under circumstances not flattering to the US. Moreover, the priority which Mr. Holifield assigns to non-weapons tests is misleading. There is no overriding need to learn more, right now, about seismic detection methods or how atomic energy can be used to move mountains. His proposal is inspired largely by the conviction, shared by many in the Congress, the Pentagon and the Atomic Energy Commission, that the national security of the United States requires further refinement of weapons and especially the development of a “neutron” or “clean” bomb. This bomb would, it is hoped, make it possible to destroy people without bathing them in fallout. The concept is, as Mr. Holifield says, “revolutionary,” and in more than one sense. Yet whether such refinements are vital to deter the Russians from military attack is at least debatable.

The talks in Geneva are going badly, and the new Russian demand for a tripartite control of any inspection system is certainly unworkable. But the alternative to Mr. Holifield's bitter prescription might be to say finally to the Russians that the present discussions are fruitless and that there is no point in continuing them. At the same time, though we would thereby have resumed our freedom to test, we would be under no obligation to do so. We could wait and watch.

The importance of testing and of the banning of tests has been grossly inflated. Further testing would not in itself change appreciably the power relationships between East and West. For what one can do today, the others can do tomorrow. And a ban on testing would likewise have little effect on the capacity of each to destroy the other; it would not diminish present stockpiles. The main argument against resuming tests is that the US should avoid alienating those who long for a breather in the Cold War and react with aversion to any step which seems to foreclose control and finally abandonment of nuclear weapons themselves.

African Trade Unions

Earlier this month at its founding convention in Casablanca, the All-African Trade Union Federation ordered its members to break off ties with other international (i.e., non-African) trade union organization within 10

months — one more sign of the drift toward political non-alignment of the new African states.

The conference set up a governing body composed of delegates from Ghana, Guinea, the UAR, Morocco, Kenya, Algeria and Mali, and agreed upon Casablanca as the permanent seat of the new federation. It saluted the struggle of the Algerian and Aden people for freedom and self-determination; racial discrimination in South Africa and French nuclear tests in the Sahara were condemned. But the crucial resolution was on affiliation with other international federations, *i.e.*, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the Communist-led World Federation of Trade Unions. The initial determination to sever all relations was supported by the WFTU itself (through its three African affiliates) in an attempt to curb the influence in Africa of the Western-oriented ICFTU which has 22 African affiliates. When this was opposed by those national unions and delegations favoring continued ties with the ICFTU it was agreed to postpone the question of disaffiliation for 10 months.

It appears unlikely that all of the African trade unions (many beset by leadership conflicts) will be willing to forgo the prestigious and educational benefits of ICFTU membership in order to unite under an independent continental banner. The ICFTU since 1958 has been running a trade union leadership training college in Kampala, Uganda (scheduled to move into its new permanent "campus" on June 27). In addition the ICFTU conducts seminars, field classes and workshops in Africa and Europe for from two days to three months for English- and French-speaking Africans on union organization, labor laws, negotiations, union administration, economics, UN structure, arbitration and conciliation. The ICFTU has not only bolstered the efficiency of the unions, but has prepared many largely untutored Africans for service in government.

Their Master's Voice

"A strong suspicion exists," Dean James Landis reported to the President earlier this year, "that far too much influence is exerted [on the Federal Communications Commission] by the networks." A look at the roll call vote in the House of Representatives on streamlining the FCC and strengthening the hand of its Chairman suggests that Dean Landis' suspicion applies with greater force to the Congress. The reason why the House rejected, by a vote of 323 to 77, an FCC reorganization plan is simply that the broadcasting industry is scared of Chairman Newton Minow. It is scared because Mr. Minow has said he means to enforce the law he was appointed to uphold. He is determined, in other words, that the "wasteland" of television shall be

transformed, if not into a garden, then into something greener than the Sahara. He has been bold enough also to say that the Communications Act passed by Congress in 1934 means what it says: "No license shall be construed to create any rights beyond the terms, conditions and period of the license." That is to say, no TV or radio station owner has any automatic right to a license in perpetuity; he must justify its renewal by showing that he has served the "public interest, convenience or necessity."

The White House had thrown in the towel before the battle started. It ended with 163 Democrats and every Republican opposing the President. Some of the ablest and most public-spirited of Mr. Kennedy's friends deserted him: Blatnik of Minnesota, Boggs of Louisiana, Brooks of Texas, Elliott of Alabama, Holifield of California, Kerwin of Ohio, Mack of Illinois, Magnuson of Washington, Pfof of Idaho, Price of Illinois, Saund of California and Zablocki of Wisconsin.

There is a respectable argument, and it was made by Speaker Rayburn, that the changes contemplated should be made by regular legislation rather than through Executive order. The defenders of this approach, including Rep. Oren Harris, are obliged, however, to come forth now with a bill that does embody the needed reforms.



"That's My Kind of Program"

WALTER LIPPMANN

Interviewed by Howard K. Smith

Smith: Is it possible that a free, loose-jointed, easy-going society like the American democracy can compete with a tightly-concentrated, tightly-controlled, secret dictatorship like that of the Soviet Union and Red China?

Lippmann: That's the question, and that is why many of us think that the Kennedy Administration has to get moving rapidly, or we won't be able to do it. I wouldn't like, for a moment, to underestimate how formidable this competition is. It's very formidable, and when you see people running around this country, wanting to abolish the income tax and turn the federal government back into a Confederation of States, you despair of the possibility of persuading them to do what we're going to have to do, and what we're going to have to do is going to take a lot of money, and it's going to take a very strong government.

Smith: Is there a good case in favor of foreign aid that isn't being made?

Lippmann: I would say that the United States can no more refuse to contribute to foreign aid, in the world, than the richest man in town can refuse to contribute to the community chest. Now, the nature of the method of aiding is very debatable. And I hope and believe that there is a movement on foot to reform some of its worst abuses. It is true, as some of the liberal critics in the Congress have been saying, that a lot of this money, as in Laos, which is a peculiarly bad case of how the thing failed – a lot of this money simply enriched the upper class who exploited, who flaunted their riches all over, and increased the hatred of the poor for the rich. And that made them very fertile ground for Communist propaganda. In other places, we've undoubtedly spent too much money on armies that have no military value whatsoever from the point of view of our interests, but are kept there, are paid for by us, in order to keep them loyal to the king or ruler of the country. Those are great abuses. On the other hand, if the world isn't going to go into that landslide into Communism which Khrushchev predicts, there have to be anchor points in all the continents, which show that prosperity and a certain amount of social justice can be achieved by another way than the Communist way. And that means that you must focus your energy, your aid on key countries. Now, if you ask me what they are – the key country in Asia is India. If India can be made to work

as a successful, democratic state, the influence of that will spread all over Southeast Asia, no matter who takes over Laos in the next few months. The key country in Latin America is not Cuba. It's Brazil. I would hesitate to say just which is the key country in Africa, but I imagine it might be Nigeria. And I think in those cases, we ought to focus our aid, not necessarily stopping this other aid, which is really a form of bribery to keep them quiet, but focus it and do enough to do it. There's no use building half a bridge across a river – you've got to build a whole bridge. . . . [Kennedy] talked to the American people as if they were suffering from some terrible burden in foreign aid. He should have told them, considering how grim the outlook is, that that was the first installment, and a very small one, on what they're going to have to pay, and that they mustn't think that they can just cut it down and have everything just the way they like it in the world.

Smith: What do we do now [about Berlin]?

Lippmann: We have taken the line, conventionally, that any change in the situation of Berlin would be for the worse. . . . That's Dr. Adenauer's view. Change nothing – fight – threaten to fight if anything is changed. Don't negotiate. It can't be negotiated. You'll only weaken it. Now, the other view, which is the one I share, is that the situation in Berlin is not good. Berlin is in a state of chronic crisis, which means that on the Soviet side, any time that Khrushchev wants to put on a little pressure, he could just turn the screw a little bit in Berlin, and the whole world is focused on Berlin, while something's going on in Iran or Cuba or heaven knows where. . . . We should say that the freedom of Berlin, in the sense of their ability to govern themselves, to live their own life, to keep their physical and economic and spiritual and political contacts with the Western world, cannot be touched. We won't negotiate about that, but the legal basis and the statutory rights that go with that, are negotiable. They were never negotiated. I would like to see [us take] the position of saying to Khrushchev, we don't like Berlin the way it is. We want to improve it, and if you can negotiate with us an improvement, we'll be very interested.

Smith: I'd like to talk to you now about the latest Russian diplomatic creation, and that is what Mr. Mikoyan called the "Troika" System of control. If that is applied,

wouldn't that stagnate all international activity?

Lippmann: I didn't speak to Mr. Khrushchev about this particular point, but I did to a very close adviser of his, a Soviet official. I said, "Why three?" He said, "Well, we really mean two." He said, "We really mean that everything must be done by agreement between the United States and the USSR. We brought in the third because they're there. They have no power, of course, but they're there and it looks better to include them." *Smith:* Well, doesn't this threaten the entire future of the United Nations?

Lippmann: Yes. The future of the United Nations is very much threatened by the fact that although Mr. Hammarskjöld has another two years, he couldn't be re-elected at present, and nobody like him could be elected, and there's quite a good chance that if there is no understanding reached with the Russians on this point (it's negotiable, but I don't know how negotiable), there just won't be a Secretary-General. And if there's no Secretary-General, the UN will be reduced to a debating society, or the Security Council will meet but it won't be able to order anything.

Smith: Well, in addition to Russian intransigence, there's another change in the United Nations, and that is the admission of a very great number of brand new nations, the leaders of many of which have shown themselves to be not very responsible and to be highly volatile. Isn't it dangerous for the United States to leave our fate to be decided by a body in which these people have the balance of power?

Lippmann: You know, Khrushchev pointed that out to me, and he said, Now you don't want a veto, because you still think you have a majority, and you can elect the Secretary-General, and so on, and it'll be all favorable to you, but pretty soon you won't be able to elect a majority, and then you'll wish you had a veto. So, in the end, you're going to want just what we want.

Smith: What should we do about Cuba and Castro?

Lippmann: The question is, is Cuba a military threat to the United States in view of the fact that it is so closely connected with the Soviet Union? It's only fair to say that up to this point, there is no evidence of any Soviet military base in Cuba. Mr. Allen Dulles told me, himself, not long ago, that in the invasion there were no Russian planes; that those planes that Castro used were old American planes. There is not a sign of a missile base, and of course, it stands to reason [if] they can shoot missiles from Siberia to the moon, why should they come 90 miles away? Anyway, we'd match that. The next danger of Castro is that propaganda and agents and money, got from the Soviet Union or China, or somewhere, can be pushed into these various countries of South America. That is a problem about which we can't do anything. We can't break up the relations

between, let's say Brazil and Cuba. That's up to Brazil. But there's nothing to prevent us from watching it. Our counter-intelligence ought to be good enough to detect a good deal of it, and we ought to keep on supplying the evidence to these governments of what's happening. But the biggest danger of Castro is that he might succeed in Cuba, in solving problems which have not yet been solved in a great many Latin American countries. That's where we have to compete with him. If he can succeed there and our friends and other Latin Americans fail, then his example is far more dangerous than anything he himself can do.

Smith: You have been opposed to taking action, military, forceful action in Laos, or unilateral action in Cuba. You have said you're in favor of negotiations over Berlin, which may involve making concessions to the Russians over Berlin. What would be your answer to those who would say that this is a policy of appeasement?

Lippmann: My answer to that would be that you can't decide these questions of life and death for the world by epithets like appeasement. Furthermore, I think the reasons for doing what I advocate, are based on the soundest, strategical principle, and that is this: The Soviet Union is not engaged in any of these places. It hasn't sent its troops anywhere. As long as it isn't engaged, we mustn't be engaged. We must always keep the central power which is the ultimate deterrent . . . to war by the Soviet Union intact, so long as theirs is intact, but if we get ourselves involved in a Korean war in Indo-China, and all our reserves begin flowing that way, or get ourselves involved in a thing we can't finish in Cuba (because the guerrilla war may go on forever), then we will weaken ourselves for what is really the issue, which is to keep the balance of power between ourselves and the Soviet Union intact, and that's the principle on which – that's the principle I have in the back of my mind in taking a position about not intervening in Laos, for example. I don't agree with the people who think that we have to go out and shed a little blood to prove we're virile men. This is too serious a business for that kind of thinking, and in regard to Cuba, my feeling was not only that, but also that it was illegal for us to do it, and we cannot go into the business of violating treaties. We're not that kind of country. And then behind that lies a very personal and human feeling – that I don't think old men ought to promote wars for young men to fight. I don't like war-like old men. I think it's their business to try as best they can, by whatever wisdom they can find, to avert what would be an absolutely irreparable calamity for the world.

– Excerpts from a conversation over CBS-TV
June 15, 1961

CHECKMATE FOR BOTH HOLLAND AND INDONESIA?

New Guinea Chess Game

Hollandia

In the game of political chess being played by the Netherlands and Indonesia in West New Guinea (West Irian), The Hague's latest and most adroit moves have come close to checkmating Jakarta. It remains to be seen whether The Hague has not also checkmated itself.

Until the New Guinea Council met for the first time on April 5 the Netherlands had a choice of several moves, some of them improbable but all capable of disengaging it with some honor from what is at best a profitless colonial situation and what may at worst become an exceedingly unpleasant and even more unprofitable war. The Hague had been – and still is – examining the possible “internationalization” of the West New Guinea dispute: in other words, it is looking for UN partners to share the burdens of political, social and economic development until the Papuans are ready for self-determination. But with the installation of the predominantly elected and predominantly Papuan New Guinea Council, Holland closed the door to all such simple solutions. Administration and legislation in West New Guinea is now possible only with the cooperation of the Council. If The Hague is to act in good faith, no decision affecting West New Guinea's future can possibly be taken now without the cooperation of the Council. And the Council members are blunt in stating that they intend to have no truck with “internationalization,” or with incorporating West New Guinea in the Republic of Indonesia.

Leading members of the Council are articulate and forthright: they will not be easily shaken from their stand. Independence for the Papuans now has a reality that did not exist before. None of the elite has any doubt that Holland intends to pull out as soon as it decently can. Seeing power virtually within their grasp, it would not be human if the Papuans did not intend to seize it. Certainly, nothing they know of Indonesia encourages them to believe that West New Guinea would be better off under Jakarta.

So far, Indonesia has relied on propaganda and threat to foment a national uprising against the Dutch. The campaign has succeeded in some ways, but not quite in the manner Jakarta expected. Since Indonesian is the *lingua franca* of all Papuans who have come into contact with the Dutch Administration, constant propaganda broadcasts beamed from several stations in East Indonesia have succeeded in making many Papuans conscious of their colonial status. This undoubted-

ly contributed to the Dutch decision to hasten the setting up of the New Guinea Council long before village, town and regional councils are generally feasible. But there is no indication that the broadcasts succeeded in making the Papuans pro-Indonesian.

One exotic Indonesian organization known as the Army of the Heroic Bird of Paradise set up cells in Hollandia and other coastal villages and was supposed to prepare political bases to welcome and support armed Papuan and Indonesian groups from Indonesia. Indonesian stewards on Dutch ships were the couriers who linked the “Army” with Jakarta. The plan was soon discovered, however, and the arrest of a couple of dozen ringleaders in Hollandia and other coastal villages, together with the dismissal of the Indonesian stewards, terminated the “Army's” activities.

This did not deter Jakarta from going ahead with its plans for landing armed infiltrators from Jakarta. A mixed platoon of Indonesian Papuans and Indonesians landed on the south coast last November with the object of stirring up an active revolt there. Instead of rising in support, however, the local population reported the infiltrators to the police and joined in the hunt that resulted some months later in the capture of all who had not died of malaria, misadventure or wounds. Even if most Papuans were in favor of Indonesia – which they are not – communications in this country, which is three times the size of New York State, are so bad that a coordinated uprising is all but impossible. Of the 150 miles of road and jeep track, 50 are around Hollandia. Three hundred thousand of the estimated 700,000 inhabitants live in remote jungle valleys in the central highlands, which are accessible only by hazardous air flight and which have not yet been either administered or properly explored.

The Indonesians are believed to have assembled 15,000 troops on the island of Ambon, the potential invasion springboard. They are lengthening and improving their air strips in the Halmaheras and in Timor, presumably for the use of their Ilyushin and MIG bombers and fighters. They have Mr. Khrushchev on their side, and since they are determined beyond doubt that West New Guinea should be theirs, they may yet find an outlet for their frustration by the use of armed force. That is a possibility no one here rules out, though no one likes to dwell on it.

DENIS WARNER

That Nebulous Monroe Doctrine

The Monroe Doctrine has been primarily a Caribbean doctrine, and in the world of James Monroe, Alfred Thayer Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt – a generation ago – the Caribbean was virtually a United States lake. Today, “enemy” planes soar with impunity through the skies above Cuba, and on the ground hostile tanks are ready to challenge our concept of who is qualified to own land is bathed by the “Sea of the New World.”

Can we possibly concede that the Caribbean – and specifically Cuba – has become an independent region no longer to be dealt with simply as a New World entity: that is, as an area which we are entitled to lead and direct according to the principles of Monroeism? Upon our answer to this question will depend what sort of Latin American policy we shape.

We have assumed that there is still some validity to the so-called “Western Hemisphere Idea,” that, in John Foster Dulles’ words, “. . . there exists among the American States some sentiment of solidarity, which sets them apart from other nations of the world.” But Latin America has dramatically been demonstrating that it does not share this view and that it does not feel bound by mystical ties to the United States. Basically out of sympathy with many aspects of our way of life, Latin American nations have longed to establish some sort of third position, or at least to drift into a non-assertive neutralism.

Only with mounting irritation and restiveness have the Latin American nations responded to our bidding since 1945, supporting us generally in the United Nations and occasionally paying lip service to concepts that are sacrosanct with us, such as free enterprise. One result for Latin America of the years spent nominally, however reluctantly, in the United States camp is that many of the Southern republics are comparatively poorer today than they were in 1945. Even countries that have increased their gross national product sufficiently to keep ahead of the population explosion have experienced a dangerously regressive income re-distribution. Their lower classes are in worse condition than they were 15 years ago.

Latin America’s reform advocates have, as a consequence, become convinced that formulas of progress for underdeveloped 20th Century countries cannot be borrowed from the United States. In their frustration, they are coming increasingly to suspect that the correct formulas may include a certain proportion of Marxist, though not necessarily Communist, methodology. The US, of course, frowns upon such methods, often unaware that some of the most effective anti-Communist literature in Latin America is written by Marxists or

other “extreme leftists” who have perceived that Communism wants to use, not benefit, their countries. This lean-to-the-Left in Latin America may pose some touchy questions for the US. For example, it is not wildly unlikely that a Communist-dominated alliance will win the 1964 Chilean presidential elections. If we feel constrained to banish Communism from Cuba, (and in my opinion, a Communist Cuba might be just the weapon we need to encourage basic social and economic reform in Latin America) would this also imply that we are committed to drive out by force of arms a Communist or Communist-dominated regime that might manage through honest elections to acquire power in another Latin American country? If that is our policy, it will place the world’s foremost champion of democratic processes in a rather embarrassing position.

The spirit of the Monroe Doctrine implies a belief that we can somehow keep the American Hemisphere uncontaminated by all non-American influences; that we can, as it were, impose some sort of a sin-free existence upon the lands of Columbus. But Latin America more and more desires to decide for itself who the sinners and who the virtuous are. It wishes to be a part of the world, no longer fenced in our back yard. Latin America will still be willing in many instances to cooperate with us, and its readiness to do so will increase the day we abandon our right to force it to heed our will: a “right” that has often been read into the nebulous Monroe Doctrine. All of the treaties, agreements, pronouncements and declarations that underlie the Organization of American States are meaningless when always in the final analysis the most potent member reserves the right to ignore its commitments and revert to the unilateral approach of James Monroe.

If we are ever to achieve success in aiding a Latin American republic, then we must convince its rulers that, however distasteful they find the notion, they must begin to work toward internal reform – altering the land and tax systems, expanding education and allowing lower classes to rise sufficiently to command respect and the ability to protect their own interests in a genuinely pluralistic and open society. This will not be easy. But it might be impossible if the United States is committed to removing the threat of Communism from the American Hemisphere by crushing it with violence whenever it appears – in accordance with the principles of the Monroe Doctrine.

FREDERICK B. PIKE

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Reinhold Niebuhr

Well-Tempered Evangelism

*The author of "Christian Realism and Political Problems"
ponders the irrelevance of Western democracy to
nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America*

I hope the newly-developed passion in Washington for training soldiers in the arts of guerrilla warfare is not blind to the dependence for success in such warfare on an intimate knowledge of the terrain and on having the support of those we wish to help. The French might have lost Indo-China because they did not invest their cause with sufficient moral and patriotic meaning; but they might have lost it strategically because of their deficiencies in the art of guerrilla warfare, for which they were not prepared. One hesitates to say this to the Pentagon and the CIA, but their failure in Cuba emboldens even the most amateurish critic.

Cuba and Laos are not particularly important in global strategy, and yet the policies pursued there and the hazards encountered may be indicative of the difficulties Western democracy faces in the whole non-European world. Our cause is usually defined as the cause of "freedom." It is more accurately defined as "Western democracy" because only in the context of European technical civilization has freedom been made compatible with justice by establishing an equilibrium of power in the economic sphere, and by using the equal political power, inherent in universal suffrage, to redress the inequalities of economic power. It took Western European civilization the whole of the 19th Century to prove that political freedom could be made the servant of both justice and stability. It proved it by correcting precisely those social patterns and social forces which we now encounter in the agrarian economies of the "undeveloped" nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Now, the impingement of modern technics upon these "underdeveloped" economies today has precisely the same effect which it had in Europe during 19th Century industrialism. It tends to aggravate the social inequalities. Thus the Marxist dogma that industrialism is merely the climax of the age-old story of exploitation seem validated. The Communist advantage over Western democracy seems to become the more impressive, when we, operating in social conditions so unlike those which produced the triumph of democracy over

social injustice, place our chief reliance on military force and solicit feudal landlords as our allies. The first policy seems to conform to the Communist dogma that "capitalism" is the source of "imperialism." The second policy seems to validate the dogma which sprang from the injustice of 19th Century industrialism in Europe.

While our errors of judgment in relating our power to the non-European cultures may aggravate our difficulties, what should also be obvious is that Western-style democracy is not immediately relevant to non-European cultures. They lack the standards of literacy, political skill and social equilibria which would make viable political freedom as we have come to know it. *That would be true even if we made no serious errors in policy.* The Vice President speaks of our mission to "preserve freedom in Asia." Alas, there is not so very much to preserve.

The evidence of democracy's weakness as a relevant alternative to dictatorship is global. In Latin America we have a long history of alternation between democracies and dictatorships. The dictatorial regimes (as in Brazil, Argentina and Cuba) usually supplant democracies in which political institutions are the servants and not the masters, of feudal powers. The standard Latin American dictatorship regime combines military power with demagogic appeals to the poor – industrial or agrarian or both. (The Kennedy Administration, in its "Alliance of Progress" made the first serious effort to break this universal Latin American social pattern, and then it discredited its own creative policy with the ill-considered Cuban venture.)

In Asia, a benevolent dictatorship has replaced a democratic regime in Pakistan. The Pakistani democracy was corrupt, was unable to solve the serious problem of regionalism in a nation whose two halves are divided by a thousand miles of Indian territory. It was unable to accomplish any serious land reform, the litmus test of the ability of a democratic political order's ability to break the back of the old feudalism. Whether the dictatorial regime can keep its promise of radical land reform must await a future answer. The

sad state of democracy in Korea is too obvious to be belabored. At first, the student revolution against the Rhee regime, a dictatorship in the garments of democracy, seemed a sign of hope. But evidently the new regime was little better than the old. Its corruptions prompted the recent Army coup by a *junta* which engages in a dangerous suppression of parliamentary and civil liberties. The fate in Turkey is equally discouraging. It seemed hopeful when the original Kemal dictatorship was transmuted into a parliamentary regime. But the party which gained the victory by democratic means, tried to avoid defeat by using military means. An Army revolt in the name of democracy was the result. South Vietnam, the "bastion of freedom," is corrupted by the family of a dictatorial president; its land reform, after a promising start, has not been too impressive, and it barely triumphed over an Army revolt recently.

India is, of course, the chief protagonist of democracy in Asia; and all of our wise men are right in emphasizing the fateful competition between India and China. We have not only partially underwritten India's second five-year plan but encouraged our Western allies to match our aid. All this is encouraging. But no honest observer could deny that democratic national institutions have barely leavened the lump of feudalism in the Indian villages, where the chief landlord is usually the agent of the Congress Party and the watchdog against Communist infiltration. What will the picture be after Nehru passes from the scene? Certainly the confusion of tongues which grows with the disappearance of the unifying English language and the curious formation of a feudal base with a democratic superstructure does not give us much ground for optimism.

In the non-committed world the situation is no brighter. Egypt and Iraq are ruled by military dictatorships. Saudi Arabia is ruled by a primitive monarchy, whose use of the oil wealth, provided by contracts with Western oil combines, enriches a profligate royal house and does nothing for the poor Arab Bedouins who for generations have scratched a living from its barren desserts and sparse pastures. A new technical bureaucracy is being trained by the oil companies; and a few

rootless intellectuals are seeking a political home. The future is uncertain, but our democratic institutions are of no immediate relevance.

This brief survey, sketchy rather than exhaustive, may be enough to indicate why Western democracy is an ultimate political ideal which requires greater political skill, cultural adequacy and a fortunate balance of social forces than are available for many non-European or, more accurately, non-technical nations. (There is always highly-industrialized Japan to remind us that technical competence is not a European monopoly. Japan is hardly an ideal democracy, but it compares favorably with France, for instance, almost two centuries after the French revolution.)

To acknowledge these difficulties does not make our struggle against Communist dogmatic politics meaningless. It ought to prepare us, however, to accept some defeats without too much hysteria; to cease defining our cause too simply as the cause of "freedom," when the political task is always to make freedom serve the justice and stability of the community. It might make us more tolerant of military dictatorships. Dangerous as they are, they are at least reversible. Communist dictatorship supported by a religio-political dogma, is irreversible; it threatens to coerce all future possibilities for mankind into its absurd categories of good and evil. An honest acknowledgment of the ultimacy of our democratic ideals and of their immediate irrelevance will certainly prevent us from debasing democracy into a competitive utopian creed with Communism. In terms of utopia, the Communist creed is bound to have the best of the competition. Such an acknowledgment will make us much more appreciative of the one-party democracies, who do not suppress parliamentary and civil liberties, but who likewise do not engage in the hazardous alternation of political authority, which characterizes mature democracies. The one-party achievements of Mexico and Tunisia should be accepted with more genuine appreciation. Perhaps we could even swallow the enormous egotism of Nkrumah, a typical parliamentary leader of a new nation who needs an inflated image of his political prestige to overawe the powerful Ashanti tribe in particular and tribal parochialism in general.

If we are generous enough in our sympathies for all types of political regimes, except those which combine pretensions of omniscience with pretensions of omnipotence, we may become in time a truly global movement, rather than a conventicle of European liberal democrats. Our policies would still be tough; but they would be flexible enough to accommodate the various levels of culture and economic and political civilization with which we must deal as an imperial nation, as one of the two imperial nations who now bestride this narrow world and hold the fate of mankind in their hands.

COMING

"The Revolution of Non-Expectations"

*Margaret Halsey on
The Kennedy Inheritance*

Military Indoctrination of Civilians

With the "admonition" last week of Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker, the Army took a tiny step toward getting the military out of politics. The General, the Army found, had made "derogatory remarks [before 200 members and dependents of his division] about certain prominent Americans," linking them "with Communism and Communist influence." His new command assignment has been cancelled.

But that isn't the end of the story, for the top brass at the Pentagon has assigned to itself and continues zealously to carry out the task of educating civilians in what they should think about the Cold War combat against Communism. Inquiries at the Department of Defense have brought to light a fact seemingly hitherto unknown: There is in existence a 1958 directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, enthusiastically given effect by individual directives in each of the military services, which by authoritative description "puts the military right square in the business of indoctrinating civilians in Cold War issues – indoctrinating the public on the nature of the Communist threat." The inspiration for the directive is attributed to Admiral Arthur W. Radford, whose term as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ended in 1957, but who was less than prompt in letting go of his desk.

The result has been a rapidly spreading growth, deliberately planned to be self-generating, of indoctrination seminars conducted under various kindred names: Strategy Seminars, Fourth-Dimensional Warfare Seminars, National Security Seminars, and Strategy for Survival Conferences. These receive their impulse from the Pentagon, and are provided with materials by military commands, addressed by the military, and attended by active and reserve personnel; they have as a primary target the minds of civilians – from tycoons to school children. Often, reservists get retirement points and drill credits for attending. The incredibly-huge mass of material pumped out is distinguished by two theses: The civilian leadership of this country is losing to the Communists; and, second, the United States must declare a total non-military war, in which the civilians must fully engage themselves, against the Communist bloc. Anything short of that, any attempt at negotiation, or agreement, becomes appeasement or even surrender. The political Right, of course, has joyously joined to help the military in this effort, though it is not dominant.

The two most powerful sources of this activity are the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the National War College, acting with not only the permission but the "encouragement" of the JCS. Their

functions are different. The ICAF has been in the business of civilian "education" a long time, as long ago as 1948, and how it started on it is lost in the mists. Its contribution is to send out teams of officers to hold seminars in American communities.

The National War College holds seminars at Fort McNair in Washington, its headquarters, at which cadres of thought-provokers are trained to infiltrate the civilian population in regional and local seminars. How this came about is fairly clear, and an interesting study.

It began with something called the National Military-Industrial Conference organized in Chicago in 1955 (and held annually since) by the Society of American Military Engineers, Illinois Institute of Technology, and the Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry, with 1,000 leaders in science, business, education and the military. In 1958, after Sputnik and other discouragements, it was determined that a year-round program of education was needed. The result was the evolution that year of what is called The Institute for American Strategy, created by educators, industrialists, scientists, and senior officers from all the military branches. The Institute was sponsored by the Richardson Foundation of New York (which, we are told, is connected with Vicks Vaporub). The research director of the foundation, Frank R. Barnett, became program director of the IAS, which he calls "a traveling civilian war college." He is the biggest single figure in this activity, and is a hero, the leader of a patriotic crusade, to those enlisted in his political warfare against The Bloc. By all accounts he is an estimable figure and no zealot Rightist, but he is indeed a zealot in the cause of total Cold War.

In 1958, also, the IAS directors "recommended" to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the seminar format of Chicago's National Military-Industrial Conference be expanded to reach reserve officers. This proposal was approved, and a July, 1959, seminar at the National War College brought together 218 reservists – Governors, college presidents, administrators and teachers, Congressmen and businessmen. The curriculum was formed by the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, which holds ideological dominance in the seminars. Under Robert Strausz-Hupe, it has developed the total Cold War proposals going under the names of "protracted conflict," "forward strategy" and so on. The alumni of the first NWC seminar generated regional seminars – and regional alumni – in such numbers that by March, 1961, Barnett was able to write that 3,700 seminar alumni have spoken before local groups. In the words of one 1959

McNair alumnus speaking at a 1960 seminar there, "this is beamed at the civilian population." The literature advertises:

"The United States Army Command and General Staff College will conduct an Anti-Communism Strategy Seminar at Fort Leavenworth 27 through 29 July, 1961. The purpose of the seminar is to provide current information on the organization, resources and methods used by advocates of international Communism. Guest speakers will outline ways by which *an informed public can create a sound and resolute climate of opinion to support US strategy for security of the Free World.* [Our italics.] About 400 military and civilian guests will participate in the seminar."

At a Fourth Dimensional Warfare Seminar held in Pittsburgh by the Chamber of Commerce on April 15, Saturday (the recommended day of the week), the Second Army and the XXI Corps were credited with help. Joseph D. Hughes, of T. Mellon Sons, reserve colonel and civilian aide to the Secretary of the Army since 1955 was a co-chairman along with William F. Chase, a bearing manufacturer. There were about 75 businessmen present, 150 high school children invited at the last minute because not enough businessmen responded, and 75 reserve officers who got retirement credits for attending. The purpose was to "provide guidance to military reservists and to selected civic and business leaders regarding the deceptive Communist subversive efforts . . . [and] to orient [sic] American thinking toward un-American ideas. . . ." Enlisted men gave out documents, some from the House Un-American Activities Committee. *Operation Abolition* was shown. The seminar heard Admiral Chester Ward, (ret.), recently the Navy's Judge Advocate General, haze the last three Presidents of the United States, ridicule Adlai Stevenson ("Oh, what a brilliant, imaginative, bold representative we have there!"), castigate George Kennan, and equate disarmament negotiations with appeasement. One listener thought Ward, a lecturer for the Institute for American Strategy, gave a preventive war speech and protested to the Secretary of the Army against government sponsorship.

This Pittsburgh meeting, let me point out, is described by the Army as "one of several sequels" to the Fort McNair seminars as "encouraged" by the JCS, and as receiving the Army's limited administrative support. That support includes a bibliography of material obtainable from the FBI, and reproduction by the Army of handout materials. The handouts include an 18-point instruction on "What you can do in the fight against Communism." Part of Point 2: "Point out that youth today is saturated with morally, sexually depraved literature on every Main street of America." Another:

"Be on the alert for Communist sympathizers in your community, especially those who can mold youth or public opinion." Another: "Identify public officials and policies displaying 'softness' toward Communism. DEMAND a more patriotic attitude." Others: "Check 'Peace' groups. . . . Be wary of films which stress social and moral depravity."

At Wilmington, N.C., in May, a team from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces held a two-week National Security Seminar. The team leader, Col. William N. Boaz, Jr., USAF, demanded for himself and his team the privilege of keeping criticism of the Kennedy Administration off the record. But with 600 persons present, the Wilmington newspapers flatly refused. Boaz said publication of what the officers might say in response to questions would weaken the seminar. He also said a foreign policy speech would be used despite a Kennedy proscription of public policy discussions by senior officers "because we do not consider ourselves senior officers." The newspaper protests brought a superior flying from Washington to straighten Boaz out.

These are only two examples. This business is happening all over. Three "Strategy for Survival" conferences were held this past April in Arkansas – at Little Rock, Fort Smith and Fayetteville – all with assistance from the military. The material here was characteristic of the extreme Rightism of Dr. George S. Benson, president of Harding College at Searcy, Ark., who seems to have been behind the Arkansas seminars.

No one would wish to question in the slightest degree the civilian role in all this. The right of assembly to discuss anything from the simplistic through the goofy to the grossly distorted is guaranteed. But the military role is indefensible. Such military intrusion in civilian education assists in the undermining of civilian leadership, including the Presidency, and specifically that leadership's quest for a decent peace. Its effect is to rule out any serious search for compromise, to equate negotiations with appeasement, and to create circumstances in which a frustrated public could one day wish to turn to the military for *their* answer to the Cold War – the insurrection of the French generals is fair warning.

The Pentagon is aware of what is going on, but says it can't fix all the leaky faucets at once. It has taken cautious steps, such as admonishing General Walker and throwing a rein on military deployment of the films *Operation Abolition* and *Communism on the Map*. But it is under obvious difficulties, because any move it makes to disengage from this sort of propaganda may bring cries of "Soft on Communism." It has the duty, nevertheless, to assert itself. The time has come for some extremely firm indoctrination of military minds by civilian authorities. And for the military to quit trying to "educate" the public politically.

FREDERIC W. COLLINS

Poor Railroads, Poor Passengers

by Asher Brynes

Last January the president of Central of New Jersey told his stockholders that their railroad would lose money even if business should improve. This was bleak news because the line had suffered continuous losses since 1957. The rest of the country has had a hard time in recent months but there has been little to justify an outlook of such settled gloom. What is going to happen to our proudest export, the image of America as problem-solver and profit-maker, if such talk spreads?

This hard-core hopelessness afflicts most of the Eastern railroads, particularly. They have been losing money hand over fist. The Pennsylvania Railroad, biggest of them all, has reported its largest loss, \$16 million in the first quarter of this year. The recently merged Erie-Lackawanna, which wants to merge again with the Pennsylvania (a proposition that, in the circumstances, does not interest the latter), reported a loss of more than \$13 million in the same period. In its last report the Reading, with headquarters in Philadelphia, took comfort from an authorization by the New Jersey Public Utility Commission which would enable it to discontinue service on a branch line that was running in the red at the rate of \$25,000 a month; but its overall losses in the first quarter of '61 were \$5,415,000.

Despite such consolidations of weakness as the Erie-Lackawanna, a veritable passion for merger has seized this staid industry. Seeking a cure for its own troubles the Pennsylvania has bought into the Norfolk and Western, and Wabash Railroads; the Norfolk and Western in turn (by a vote of 99.5 percent of its stockholders) is planning to merge with the New York, Chicago and St. Louis, or as it is better known the Nickel Plate Railroad. Farther West the Great Northern Railway's stockholders have approved a merger with the Northern Pacific, the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy, and the Spokane, Portland and Seattle Railroads by an overwhelming vote.

One of the few Eastern railroads (Chesapeake and Ohio) that made handsome profits last year (\$42 million) has bought so deeply into the Baltimore and Ohio, a financially-distressed road, that the consummation of this merger waits only upon the permission of the Interstate Commerce Commission: A touch of comedy – if anything in this sad business can be called comic – has been furnished by the spectacle of the president of the New York Central who belatedly appreciated the consequences of such a merger to his own railroad, and is now pamphleteering and speechifying with all his

might to prevent it unless he is allowed to join. The Central, one of his leaflets says, "is the obvious prime target for the C&O-B&O raid on other freight business." Other merger contests between major lines such as the Santa Fe and the Union Pacific over control of the Western Pacific Railroad are going on elsewhere.

In the decline of the industry, of which these mergers are symptomatic, service has been barely maintained or it has deteriorated, particularly for passengers; and passengers have turned increasingly to other forms of transportation. Thirty-five years ago, railroad passenger traffic amounted to 40 billion passenger-miles, as the industry reckons it; today the figure is down to half in a population that has increased by over 50 percent. The cumulative deficit on railroad passenger business rose to almost three-fourths of a billion dollars in 1957. The Transportation Act of 1958, which was passed to alleviate this situation, initiated a policy of more liberal abandonment of train service wherever the railroads could show persistent losses on the particular service. The result was a reduction of such deficits to about half a billion dollars last year. And as passenger business continues to fall, still more lines are being abandoned, and railroad pressure for loans, tax relief, subsidies – particularly for the maintenance of commuter services – continues to mount.

These statistics of passenger traffic service deficits are computed, it should be noted, according to the accounting methods of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and they have been the subject of controversy. They should be taken with a few grains of salt. Overall deficits vary, generally speaking, according to the ratio of freight to passenger business; for although freight traffic has fallen off too, the shrinkage is much smaller and that service continues to be profitable. Consequently, railroads with the highest passenger-to-freight ratios such as the New York, New Haven and Hartford, the New York Central, and the Pennsylvania are in the deepest trouble and their passenger service deficit figures are more nearly correct in reflecting the actual loss of the system from that particular service. The profit on freight traffic service is now down to 2.63 percent.

Poor as this cumulative figure undeniably appears, it hides a still worse situation in the East, where net revenues for freight service fell from \$239 million in 1955 to \$33 million last year. Railroads with relatively little freight traffic – the New York, New Haven and

Hartford is the notorious case – have been in trouble so long that their managements seem to have grown accustomed to adversity, and know how to live by it.

Busted Monopolies

We are confronted with a mess of such immense proportions that one wonders how it happened. Part of the explanation is historical. Our railroads are busted monopolies surrounded by layers of restrictive legislation, federal and local, designed to curb and tax them when they were young, powerful and wealthy. They used to raise so much hell that the phrase, to “charge all the traffic will bear,” entered the language through the practice of the robber barons who once infested this branch of business enterprise. These rugged individuals plundered customers and shareholders alike. At about the time federal regulatory legislation was first enacted only one American railroad listed on the London Exchange (1889) was paying dividends on its stock. This enactment, as well as similar legislation passed in response to popular demand through the first decade of this century, was – for one reason or another – toothless. Finally, in the first year of Woodrow Wilson’s *New Freedom* (1913) the Interstate Commerce Commission was given the authority to apply a valuation procedure to the rights of way, rolling stock and other properties of the railroads as a basis for rate-setting. Oldstyle liberals such as Charles Austin Beard hailed this achievement with righteous satisfaction:

“So, through political action in one sphere and direct labor action [by the railroad brotherhoods] in another, a large and important class of American property owners suffered a substantial diminution of their incomes for the benefit of wage-earners, travelers and shippers. In other words, by a gradual and peaceful operation was effected a transfer of economic goods greater in value than the rights shifted from the French nobility to the peasantry by the National Assembly on the night of the famous fourth of August, 1789. Reputable historians now recorded in their books that the theory of the public interest was being substituted for the older doctrine of *laissez faire*.”

If this comparison of the activities of the ICC and the brotherhoods of locomotive engineers, trainmen and conductors, and the French Revolution, now seems somewhat strained, it is nevertheless an index of the way the department of the railroads affected our immediate ancestors. They were the “octopus” of Frank Norris’ famous novel – the grim curtain-raiser to a whole literature of muckraking. From the Grangers of the seventies to the Farm Bureau Federation of the twenties, every major farm organization came out for

drastic regulation of the railroads. Other businesses and civic groups joined in, particularly after it became known that Standard Oil was being favored with special discounts or rebates on its freight costs which gave that “trust” a decisive advantage over its competitors.

By the time of the First World War railroads were divested of any real power of independent action in matters concerning train service, freight rates or passenger fares. They could choose only to give *more* service than the rules established by the ICC and the state utility commissions required. This dubious freedom was in time converted by them into a charter of prosperity. As regulated monopolies they learned how to reorient their operating policies so that they could extract benefits from their new status. As long as they were in fact monopolies, no matter how carefully regulated, they could manage for themselves an assured prosperity. The method they used is familiar to any cost-plus contractor whose profit is pegged at a fixed percentage of his operating expenses. Railroads have never been exactly contractors to the public, of course, but in the absence of competition from other forms of transportation the effect was similar. Except for a marginal diversion of the heaviest types of freight to waterways, most of the nation’s passenger and freight traffic had to go by rail.

So railroad managements voted themselves an easy life, which generally included harmonious relationships with the brotherhoods. This is illustrated by a little-known incident that throws some light on the evolution of the so-called featherbedding work rules that are now under study by a special commission. Back in 1902, 15 years after the passage of the first federal regulatory legislation for railroads, the officials of the Southern Pacific and the Santa Fe together with the railroad brotherhoods agreed that two fully-manned locomotives should be used to pull each 10-car train over the San Bernardino Pass in the California High Sierras; and more locomotives were to be used in the same proportion on longer strings of cars. This rule made sense at the beginning, for the locomotives of the day were wood burners with funnel stacks, capable of slight tractive effort on such grades. In later years the Western railroads developed huge steam monsters for this service, among them the famous Pacific-type locomotives that shook the earth for miles around and were so impressive that the composer Arthur Honegger wrote a tone poem about one of them. Those gigantic engines, fully-manned, continued to be utilized in place of the clanking little wood-burners, at the established rate of two per 10-car train for more than a quarter of a century. It took a war to put a stop to this nonsense.

Railroad labor and management still get along more harmoniously than their counterparts in other industries under the common belief that theirs is still a

monopoly type of business. No doubt it is, in the sense that the nation will keep most of the railroads operating somehow whether they are solvent or not. This conviction is buttressed by a structure of special legislation and administrative regulation which governs the relationships between the railroads and those who work for them, and also with the federal, state and local governments. The subsidies they received in earlier years were in the form of land grants and government loans; now most of the excess real estate has been sold and the original loans repaid. The habit of depending on subsidy remains, however, and one of the odd facts about this industry is the amount of bonded indebtedness normally carried by the railroads. It has remained at about 50 percent of their total financing for decades. To put it in another way, stockholders own only a half interest in the American Railroad system. The consequence is that, barring the most prosperous periods, the railroads of this country live in a perpetual state of hock.

On the basis of present earnings it is difficult to arrange for financing through the issuance of shares, of course; the problem of the railroads is to get out of the red, for taken as a whole they are still losing money (the total net loss in the first quarter of this year was \$13 million). They complain that they are over-taxed and over-regulated. They say that they are not only prevented from competing fairly with other forms of transportation by the rate-setting procedures of the Interstate Commerce Commission, but that the air transport and trucking industries are both under-taxed and subsidized to boot. "The railroads are like a man operating a corner store," reads one of their impassioned pleas to the public, "who is required to write his prices in large letters on his store windows . . . while his competitor on the opposite street corner operates under no such compulsions and has only to come across the street and read the posted prices to know what he should charge to attract the business."

Severe Attack of Competition

The most serious of the inequalities under which they must operate, as they see it, lies in the immunity from regulation provided by law when traffic is handled by common carriers on our highways and waterways. Specifically, not only is the carriage of agricultural and horticultural products exempt from rate regulation, but the movement of any commodities in bulk by water is also exempt when "not more than three different commodities occupy any one vessel, barge or tow of barges." Thus because of the bulky nature of water shipments only about 10 percent of domestic water carrier traffic comes under ICC rate regulation at all. As a consequence, intercity freight traffic on

rivers and canals has tripled in the past 20 years (rising from 3 to 9 percent) while the proportion of such freight carried by the railroads has fallen from 70 to 45 percent. As for freight traffic carried by truck, it has risen from 7 to 22 percent. Railroad passenger traffic, on the other hand, has fallen to less than a quarter of the level that prevailed after the First World War, on an absolute basis, that is, making no allowance for the vast increase of population since that time. Indeed, it is common talk among railroad men that the prosperity of some lines, such as the Nickel Plate, is due to the early decision, by far-sighted and efficient management, to cut passenger service, decades ago.

What the railroads are suffering from today is a severe attack of product competition, as it is called in other branches of trade. This trouble is complicated by the laws and regulations imposed on them to protect the public when they were monopolies. Now that they must compete with other forms of transportation, these restrictive rules serve to protect their competitors rather than the public. Except where special circumstances exist they are forbidden, for instance, to engage in transportation by motor carrier unless it is auxiliary to train service, that is, to transportation by truck of rail traffic at railroad rates and under railroad bills of lading to and from points on the rail line itself. They are forbidden altogether from air and water carrier operations. They cannot, in short, diversify their operations to provide the type of one-package or door-to-door service, in most cases, that the trucking industry is able to furnish.

Emphasis on the further consolidation of railroad lines as a cure-all for the sickness of this industry, however, has led to growing resistance by labor, and this has reacted upon the Congress. One ICC commissioner has flatly said that there will be many fewer railroads in 10 years than there are now; indeed, if the applications for mergers that are now pending or on the way to the ICC should be approved, we would shortly have one-tenth of the rail lines that exist today. As a result, Congressional resolutions designed to suspend the ICC's power to approve any mergers at all have been introduced – and the ICC has responded with the charge that such action would break up all present attempts to consolidate any lines whatever.

An authority on rail matters in the Senate has put the case realistically: "I hope the Commission will not approve mergers solely to make the railroads' financial statements look good. The intention of the law is not to merge two strong railroads. It's to get rid of weak ones." The present enthusiasm for merging the railroads into solvency attacks but one aspect of the problem. It will help the industry to cut its costs – but does it necessarily follow that if this is done the railroads will provide a better service?

This is the first of two articles.

Tractors for Lives

Like Lord Jeffrey Amherst, Adlai E. Stevenson unquestionably is "a man of great renown," and it is inconceivable that he is merely sight-seeing as he rambles through South America. But it is almost equally inconceivable that we shall have an early and definite progress report from him. On his return he will, of course, submit a formal report to the President, and possibly one to the public; but the chance that it will say anything is remote. For his mission is to unscramble eggs which, while not as hopeless as the elder Morgan thought, is an operation of great delicacy in which haste would be fatal. To be completely successful Stevenson must undo the effect on Latin-American relations of a hundred years of stupidity broken by only two flashes of intelligence – when Dwight Morrow was sent to Mexico and when Rex Tugwell was sent to Puerto Rico. No, come to think of it, Ernest Gruening went there before Tugwell; and that, too, was an appointment that made sense.

On form, Stevenson is certainly the best man in the country for the job, but, as every horse-player knows, events sometimes knock the best dope-sheet cock-eyed. One event, the reception given the Castro tractor deal in this country, gives rise to some doubt that Stevenson was the right man. Perhaps it should have been the nearest equivalent of Joe McCarthy still extant.

What Stevenson is best at is conveying an impression of reasonableness and good-will. Undoubtedly he has been telling the South Americans that we have no designs on either their liberties or their property and would be happy to see them prospering under governments of their own choice. It is likely that he is being highly persuasive because he believes it himself and a man who believes in his cause is usually persuasive. But is it true?

Six months ago this observer would have said, Yes – at least as far as the American people, not the bureaucrats, are concerned. That guess would have been based on the American record of generosity toward people in trouble anywhere in the world. A flood on the Yangtze, an earthquake in Messina, a volcanic eruption on Martinique brought an instant and bountiful response.

But when Castro, the slave-master, put 1,200 human beings on the auction block, and it was proposed that Americans put up a few millions to save them from torture and death, a hideous roar of protest arose. Peo-

ple, including some who are, to my own knowledge both decent and intelligent, got the curious idea that to exhibit the quality of mercy would be somehow an affront to our dignity.

True, if the government had been involved the act might have been construed as a confession of guilt. But nobody suggests that Dr. Milton Eisenhower, Mrs. Roosevelt and Mr. Reuther had the remotest connection with the ill-fated expedition; and it is they, all three private citizens, who are asking the money.

It would be idiotic to suggest that this indicates that the American people have suddenly developed murderous tendencies toward Cubans, but it does indicate that we are appreciably less amiable than we were in 1915 and 1916, when we poured out money for Belgian relief, even though some complained that we were thereby aiding the Germans. Without doubt Belgian relief did aid the Germans to some slight extent; but it saved a great many people from death in a horrible form, and that is what counted with Americans.

No doubt 500 tractors would be of some assistance to Castro; but there was a time when we should not have cared about that if the tractors would save 1,200 lives. Apparently we do care now; which definitely indicates a hardening of our attitude.

Since 1916 we have been through two World Wars, a "police action," and a depression. Misfortune does not always ennoble; sometimes it makes people meaner and tougher than they were before. If anything like that has happened to Americans – and the response to the tractor deal more than hints that it has – the fact is regrettable, but it would be still more regrettable not to face the fact and act accordingly.

There is a possibility, slight but disturbing, that Mr. Stevenson may paint a portrait of the American of 1916 and present it to the South Americans as a portrayal of the American of 1961. He would not wittingly deceive them; but it is possible that he cherishes a better opinion of his fellow-citizens than we deserve.

If that should be the case, then only two courses are open to us – to live up to that good opinion, or else to repudiate it, fast. An invasion of Cuba on any pretext whatever would, of course, demolish it instantly; and if we are as miserly and cynical as the tractor business suggests that might be the best thing that could happen for South America, ruinous as it would be for us.

Region-by-Region Disarmament

by David R. Inglis

Again last week, Mr. Khrushchev said that "if the Western powers agree to universal and complete disarmament, the Soviet Union is ready to accept any system of control they may conceive. But since it is impossible to get instantaneous, complete disarmament and simultaneous assurance of compliance, partial or complete disarmament would be more acceptable if it could be achieved by gradual stages, with a reasonable degree of inspection and assurance that each step has been completed before the next is undertaken. But such staged plans run into the difficulty that military secrecy is incompatible with unhampered and effective inspection. One cannot, for example, inspect for hidden missiles, to ascertain what percentage are being retired, without discovering the exact location of missile launching sites. Disarmament staged in this way may look good on paper, but it is not salable to the Soviet Union if it contains enough inspection to satisfy the US. It was largely because of this fundamental incompatibility that the Geneva Conference on Disarmament in the spring of 1960 appeared to students of disarmament to be doomed before it began. Yet, during those debates it did become clear that complete disarmament, if it were *politically* acceptable, would have one very unique technical advantage. With complete disarmament, neither side would have military secrets to guard and so would have no military reason for not letting inspectors roam at will. Even Premier Khrushchev, who seemed so allergic to inspectors when partial disarmament was discussed, emphasized again and again that the USSR could afford to admit inspectors freely to verify compliance if there was agreement on complete disarmament. We should consider it fortunate that the Soviet leaders express this view. However, by itself it is not very useful, for what is needed is some plan that gets us from where we are to where we want to go, without imposing too great a security risk along the route.

A plan that might accomplish this has been suggested recently. Instead of disarming gradually *by categories of weapons*, it is proposed to disarm gradually *by regions* within each country. Since inspectors and geographic military secrets can't coexist, we eliminate the

secrets, such as missile sites, by opening one region at a time to inspectors, as that region is disarmed. This eliminates only a fraction of national military power at any one stage. The proposal has had several independent origins: Professor Louis Sohn and his colleagues in Cambridge, Massachusetts; and in less detail by Academician Alexandrov, director of the Atomic Energy Institute in Moscow and Dr. Melvin Mooney in New York. (Perhaps it should be called the "Sohn-Alexandrov-Mooney Plan.")

In brief outline, Professor Sohn's idea is to have each nation divide itself into, let us say, six regions which it considers to be of equal military value. (If it divides them unequally, it may have put itself at a military disadvantage in the late stages.) A complete inventory of arms and military installations within each region, but without identifying their exact location, is submitted to an international control authority. Preparations are made so that, on a given day, the first-stage regions to be disarmed are chosen by lot (or, perhaps better, by choice of the "other side") and international inspectors pounce on borders and transportation facilities to seal off arms transport. Detailed inventories, with locations given, are then submitted for these chosen regions and the inspectors disarm them. The inspectors then have a year or so to search the region very thoroughly, to verify that there are no hidden arms. This permits a good check on the previously submitted nationwide military inventory on a random-sampling basis. Some confidence is developed, and as the successive steps proceed, region by region, the sampling becomes more adequate and confidence is further increased. Thus disarmament and inspection spread gradually and simultaneously over each country, region by region. When the time comes to disarm the last region, each side has strong reason to believe that the inventory submitted by the other is accurate, and ideally each should be able to trust the completeness of the disarmament of the last region. A nation would not know which region was to be the last, so it could not prepare it differently in advance. Also there would have to be an inspection of production facilities (which will not disclose geographic military secrets like missile sites) to prevent production of important weapons in the last-to-be-disarmed region while the next-to-last is being disarmed. There are numerous details which would need to be worked out, and skeptics can doubtless make gaming studies of cheating and counter-cheating procedures. But as a general approach, this "randomized region-by-region

DAVID R. INGLIS, a physicist at the Argonne National Laboratory, recently returned from Oslo where he and other American scientists followed up their discussion in Moscow last December with a number of Soviet scholars interested in disarmament.



plan with prior inventory," as proposed by Professor Sohn, seems so superior to earlier proposals as to open new doors to practical consideration of disarmament.

One advantage of the randomized region-by-region plan is that it is adaptable to a variety of disarmament procedures and objectives. It might be agreed, for example, to eliminate long-range missiles and aircraft, but to leave defensive radar networks, mobile ground-to-air missile units, heavy tanks and artillery. Or it might lead to complete disarmament down to the level of machine guns for police purposes. We may assume that each side will be cautious lest the other get some substantial advantage to upset the balance of deterrence at some stage of the disarmament process. But under this plan the arms in the regions still to be disarmed would still be nearly enough balanced. (Especially with the "hard" missile bases of the near future, the balance does not have to be very exact to maintain deterrence — a great preponderance would be required for one side to be able to launch a deliberate attack without fear of terrible retribution.)

But at the last stage, caution begets further reservations. Most thinkers on the subject agree that a completely disarmed world would be in danger of not remaining disarmed and warless, and that some residual power center is needed to police the disarmed nations, just as a local constabulary polices a neighborhood.

Whether the world armed force should be an instrument of the United Nations or of some specially created supranational authority need not concern us here. It need only be recognized that there would have to be an international armed force, strong enough to suppress any clandestinely produced military force, and an acceptable organ of decision and command. Disarmament should be viewed as a transition to this state of affairs. The fashioning of an acceptable organ of decision and command looks difficult and may take rather long; the choice of a plan for disarming the last region depends on how long we think it will take. If it would take only six years, say, then the six stages lasting a year apiece would lead right into it without any slowing down of the pace at the end.

Realism suggests, however, that the establishment of a satisfactory world police authority would take considerably longer than six years; though the danger of accidental war is so great that a substantial degree of disarmament should be introduced as soon as possible. These apparently contradictory claims could be reconciled by modifying the last stage of the randomized region-by-region plan to include a state of "transitional deterrence," as W. W. Rostow calls it.

To illustrate, there could be an agreement that each of the two great powers would retain 50 nuclear missiles for quite a few years. The number of missiles might be 20 or 200, depending on what is agreed to be sufficient for effective deterrence, but in any case the number would be much less than the thousands both sides would otherwise have.

Not only would the number of missiles be small enough to reduce the chances of accidental war, but the number would be the same, on both sides, reliably counted by inspectors having free access to the whole territory. Fortunately, this can be arranged without giving away the kind of target information that would make the missiles vulnerable to attack by the other side.

Fifty Missiles Apiece

Two types of installations may be mentioned here as illustrative of the possibilities. The first is the rail-mobile system, as has been proposed for our Minuteman missiles. After regions one to five have been disarmed, the permitted number of missiles could be installed on special, isolated lengths of track in these regions. The inspectors, free to roam otherwise, might be excluded from the immediate vicinity of these tracks except for the initial inspection and for periodic inspection of a few missiles at a time after the system is working. Or, they could have continuous access but no means of instant communication, for any information about location would lose its secrecy value after about an hour. The second type of installation is the full-and-

empty silo system. Each nation might be permitted 10 times as many "silos" as missiles and have the freedom to shuffle the missiles occasionally within a regional group of silos unobserved, subject to occasional access by inspectors on a regional basis. There would remain enough uncertainty of location that it would take many missiles to knock out one, and with equal numbers of missiles on the two sides there would be little temptation to strike first. With such an equalized and controlled deterrence during the transitional period, there would be no difficulty about disarming the last region.

I appreciate the air of unreality this plan may have to many people, including perhaps some of the Russian and American officials who will shortly begin bilateral disarmament talks. Our preponderant national attitude is one of grave skepticism about far-reaching disarmament or indeed about any important agreement with the Soviet Union. In the past it has been easy to justify this skepticism by noting the incompatibility of inspection and secrecy. But now we must re-examine our skepticism and decide whether we should really pursue disarmament as a practical possibility. From one point of view, a plan such as the one outlined seems utterly fantastic, but from another it is more fantastic that we should pursue an infinite arms race for the sake of some limited reassurance in the near future, but with no end in sight but ultimate disaster. Putting off disarmament for the next generation to establish is not the right answer, for this becomes increasingly difficult as the arms race spirals. Why shouldn't we press for an agreement to reduce the Soviets' deterrent force and ours to 50 missiles apiece over the next six years? Why not?

The troubles of which Laos and the Congo are typical come to mind. We are contending with the USSR for economic and ideological and even military influence in various parts of the world. At first sight, a serious disarmament agreement may seem inconsistent with this competition, but it need not be. The conflict in the Congo is not significantly influenced by the arms level at which the East-West strategic deterrent balance is maintained. The relevant fact about missiles is that each side is deterred from starting a major war, no matter whether this deterrence is accomplished by 50 nuclear missiles apiece or by thousands.

Any new set of rules to govern the power relationships among the dominant nations would presumably have to establish a compromise between encouraging stability within the newly-emergent countries and permitting indigenous change. They should permit revolution of oppressed peoples but somehow insulate both the forces of revolution and those of established governments from foreign intrigue and outside military intervention. The development of such a set of rules acceptable to both the East and the West is the prerequisite for any workable international armed force. But

the important point here is that there is no need to await this development before disarming down to the "transitional deterrent" level. That is the purpose of the transitional deterrent, to provide the time in which a set of rules for the operation of the international force can be worked out and approved.

Would the Soviets Accept?

Among the many questions about a region-by-region plan requiring further discussion are these: (1) What about secrecy of weapons design during the first few stages? It may be possible to arrange for sufficient inspection to identify and disarm nuclear weapons without revealing the sort of refined inner detail that goes beyond the technology known to both sides. But with facilities for manufacture already under control, the importance of loss of such secrecy during the transition to disarmament would in any case be greatly diminished. (2) What about hidden nuclear stockpiles? Despite free access of inspectors and approximate accounting for past production, unless "inspection by the people" becomes effective, there may be some hidden stockpiles of fissionable material. But with the usual military means of bomb delivery under strict control and with reasonable surveillance of other means, this risk constitutes only a limited threat which would be more than covered by the transitional deterrent or the final international force. (3) Would the Soviets accept any such plan? They would be much more likely to accept this than a plan requiring thorough inspection without thoroughgoing disarmament. If we want any useful agreement at all, it is essential to propose some way by which we make substantial concessions in return for surrender by the Russians of their superior military secrecy. At a higher level of armament, they would prefer to "keep us guessing" and thus perhaps cover up any areas of relative weakness there may be. At 50 missiles apiece, they could feel confident that they can maintain equality, as could we.

The professed Soviet desire for complete disarmament is probably genuine, though based on insufficient study of the consequences. The experience of the Scientists' Conference on Disarmament at Moscow last December, in the course of which some of the ideas here presented were developed, left the impression that at least some individual Soviet scientists, and one might hope also the Soviet Government, would find a region-by-region approach to a transitional deterrent plan acceptable under conditions which both sides could recognize as mutually beneficial. The aim is complete disarmament under a multi-national police force, but the transition envisaged here would be slower than the Russians now ask. The way to find out what the Russians might accept is to make a proposition.

AS AMERICAN AS BUTTERSCOTCH METRECAL

What happens in an advanced modern nation is that every possible human need and desire is identified, sorted out, and then its gratification – its ever more complex and convenient gratification – is efficiently mass-produced. If this leaves something more to be desired, then some enterprising fellow learns that from his consumer studies, and Something More to Be Desired is efficiently mass-produced too.

That is what has happened with this Food thing. You want to eat food? It is undeniably available. You want *not* to eat food? Non-food is available too.

No doubt there still exist along the road many of those admirable places called Diners, fittingly advertised with the forthright neon injunction EAT. But the technology of eating has refined itself far beyond that simple stage of development. In a supermarket one can now obtain, not only frozen ham dinners, but also Cantonese style dinners, or frozen sweet and sour pork, or frozen sukiyaki dinners, or a frozen Oh Boy family style pizza ("Wow! Have a pizza PARTY! in handy heat-and-serve pan 89c). Restaurants are not merely restaurants, but Steak Houses or Pancake Houses (blueberry, coconut, or creme de menthe syrup on Danish, boysenberry, or chocolate pancakes).

We not only discriminate more and more acutely each desire to be gratified, *en masse*, but we also become more and more self-conscious about the gratification we are receiving. Advertising keeps telling people how much – how very, very much – they are Enjoying what they are paying for, and this may sometimes even go to the point that the telling is more central to the Enjoyment than the fundamental experience itself. Like the movie producer who didn't know how to deal with his experience until he could fit it into something he had seen in movies, so we may not know what to think of something until its price and advertising tell us. One big thing about the fancy new expense account restaurant, called Tower Court, on top of the new Time-Life building in New York, for example, is the self-conscious attention paid to the fact that, boy, we sure are eating. The headwaiter says "I am Armand," and takes you to the table, where Pierre, the waiter, and Suzette, the waitress, introduce themselves, too (one of our party, a gregarious fellow, was at the point of making introductions all around). An "intermission" is provided, just before the entree, and is explicitly listed on the program and mentioned by Armand; it consists of a pause, presumably for our palates to adjust themselves, and also of a thimbleful of some palate-adjusting stuff like strawberry sherbet. Then when the entree comes, a small table is wheeled up and three

possibilities successively uncovered. The meat and the sauce of each is carefully described. I thought perhaps that Armand or Pierre might comment on it editorially while we chewed.

Anyway, the eating side of things has gone pretty far. But now there appears Metrecal, the new reducing stuff, and hard on its heels Calorid and Subtract, and also – put out by the milk companies – Forti-cal and Slenderway, and Cal-away, all non-foods competing in the non-eating business, which apparently is big. These products efficiently provide what is necessary to lose weight (few calories) plus what is necessary to sustain life (nutrition) without total sacrifice of Satisfaction. The stuff is advertised to taste good, and some of it is all right – rather like a milk shake made by an inattentive soda jerk, thin and slightly odd. One company has even put out the 900 measured calories – the whole day's supply – in Ice Cream form, thus fulfilling, possibly with butterscotch Metrecal poured over it, a teenage girl's dream.

In a few years one may expect a variety of synthetic food-type measured-calorie eating materials, delivered in cartons by the milkman, for everyday, and then in fancy specialty shops and fancy restaurants, for big occasions, one will be able to obtain – flown over just that day from Copenhagen – elegant samples of the old-fashioned random calorie unsynthesized meat and vegetables and fruit. ("Come over on Saturday night. We're having Food.") The already familiar alternation between 17-course restaurant dinners or chocolate pancake binges or barbecued hog parties, on the one hand, and crestfallen gestures toward reducing, on the other, will become universal. Everyone's weekly calorie count will go something like this: Monday, 900 (strictly Metrecal, fine start); Tuesday, 1,200 (not bad); Wednesday 2,500 (Oops, passed bakery on way home); Thursday, 1,300 (that's better); Friday, 3,500 (here comes the week-end); Saturday . . . well, Saturday, about 13,000. New week. Start over. Sunday, 4,500 (still hungry); Monday 4,000 (still hungry, and cashew nuts left over from party); Tuesday (finally and guiltily), 900.

Good, solid, American words and phrases like "grub" and "victuals" and "come and git it" – words on which the country was built – will pass out of the language. And what will the "boys" fight for in another war? Not mom's apple pie. Those cans of butterscotch Metrecal? the coconut syrup at Uncle John's Pancake House? *pâté* at La Salle du Bois?

Anyway, here we come: fattening and thinning, fattening and thinning, fattening and thinning, on into the perilous Sixties. WILLIAM LEE MILLER

BOOKS AND THE ARTS

A Simple Lesson in Arithmetic

by John Stewart Carter

The necessity of simple arithmetic at middle age struck me with peculiar horror a few years back when I read an examination paper which began "*A Farewell to Arms* has stood the test of time." I could of course remember the excitement with which we awaited the monthly installments in the old *Scribners*. The quality of this excitement is hard to assess at this late date because the Hemingways were neighbors of ours and later we were told (even though the dates were wrong) that Dr. Hemingway committed suicide because "Ernest wrote that terrible book." But the fact remains that *A Farewell to Arms* is the first adult book which I read, not as an assignment, but in an adult fashion, and here I was being told that it had stood the test of time. Simple subtraction made it starkly evident that my students stood in relation to *A Farewell to Arms* much as I had in relation to *The Return of the Native*, and never for a moment had I considered *The Return of the Native* a modern novel.

We are constantly being told that English teachers are not doing their jobs, that students don't know how to read, and that no one really reads after he has left college. What is it that we would like them to read? *Time*? *The New Yorker*? *The Saturday Evening Post*? The directions on how to install a disposal, or set up a TV antenna?

The other night I watched a TV class on the local educational channel. The teacher, whom I knew well, was teaching Ring Lardner's "Haircut." This is a chestnut of the first water and to my certain knowledge has been taught to college freshmen and high school seniors for at least twenty years, usually to make a point of its irony and to show how skillfully Lardner develops the plot by implication rather than direct statement. Well, this is how it still

was being "taught," and "taught" very well. There were, as I remember, nine points on the blackboard, and these we were asked to follow with a pointer while *vive voce* we were told just where in the story the point was made. I can remember *Silas Marner* being done for me in just such a fashion, but I have never re-read *Silas Marner* as an adult – even in preparation for my doctor's orals. The TV professor was doing what we were taught to do, what our teachers did, and what administrators look upon as a thorough job – even though the demonstrable result is that no one reads, least of all the people who know the nine points.

"Haircut" is written in the tradition of the "well-made tale"; this is now a matter of some historical interest, but the "well-made tale" is no longer written by serious artists, and we are teaching the general student a skill for which, if he likes to read, he will have no use. I would venture to say that by the time "Haircut" itself became a *pièce de théâtre* in freshman English classes, very few such stories were being written, although they were, of course, still very much admired. If they are admired at all today, they are admired for entirely different reasons, reasons which are not so easily taught,

and reasons which such teaching obscures for all time since it focuses the attention on what Yeats called the "stitching" when he said that poetry was the least rewarding of the arts because the poet has to take such infinite care with his "stitches" and yet if the "stitch" – however minute, however "artistic" – showed, the emotional effect was forever lost. It is the *unexplainable*, the *irrational*, (to use Poe's word), which teases us out of thought and makes literature a lifetime religion and reading a vocation. "I am dying, Egypt, dying" is not great poetry because Anthony has felt the conflict of love and honor; "She should have died hereafter" does not depend for its effect on the clinical study of ambition in *Macbeth* or because it occurs in the "falling action." The Golden Gate bridge appeals to our aesthetic sense not because it is a triumph of engineering, but because we conjure up the mind of the man, "the mirror of the aching flesh is other flesh, not glass."

Now these things have been known for a long time, but since I am writing about what we loosely call "contemporary literature" and our job should be to train students to read not what has been but what has not yet been written, let us take the last fifty years, remarking by the way the marvelous future force of the English infinitive. The date of "Death in Venice" is 1911; so the story and I were conceived at the same time. My father, my student's grandfathers could have written it, but still I am able to call it contemporary. How is it to be read? Or taught?

Let's take Mr. Agnowski whom you have identified as a great hulk in the third row behind Miss Eames of whom you have a vague recollection from a former class. You could give a little quiz asking the age of the central character of "Death in Venice," what resort he stopped at before he came to Venice, the number of children Aschenbach had. This would establish without a doubt who had and who had

Summer Schedule

During the summer months, *The New Republic* will not appear on the following dates:

July 17 July 31
August 14 August 28

Weekly publication will be resumed with the issue dated September 4.

not freshly read the story. But you really know this already. Miss Eames has because she trusts you. Mr. Agnowski hasn't because he refuses to meet your eyes. But you still have to teach the story and you still have to teach Mr. Agnowski so that he will trust you the next time and read the story too. You make some remarks about compulsive behavior, keeping the examples as simple as you can. Mr. Agnowski may even be coaxed to contribute one about how his mother always has to empty ash trays even when people – "meaning me," (guffaw) – are using them. Gradually you can begin to talk about Aschenbach's compulsion and the general relationship between compulsion and sex. If you haven't noticed a reference in the newspapers that day, someone in the class will volunteer an illustration. Compulsion and sex are both well known to Mr. Agnowski, but the chances are that the connection between the two has escaped his notice.

What Mr. Agnowski is interested in is his own particular complex – even as you and I – but he can be led from this interest to an interest in Aschenbach as a human being related in some particulars to himself, although on the face of it no one could be further removed – the fastidious, the learned, the sincere, the renowned, the indubitably homosexual intellectual and the second generation, bewildered, nearly illiterate, indubitably heterosexual peasant who has dimly heard ya gotta get a degree but who has been unwilling to read the story. The idea that homosexuality is a topic of serious interest even to those not so afflicted has never entered his mind. He only knows what he has read on toilet walls, and this in no way prepares him for the act of sympathy which in the end Mann demands for the corseted, dyed, rouged grotesque of a hero who dies upon the Venetian sands.

All the details of a story – any story – do not operate in the same fashion for all readers; no writer would suppose that they did; that's why he provides a variety. It would be futile and stupid to suppose that the fact that Mann chooses Frederick the Great for the subject of Aschenbach's great work

and has him dream of the Grecian boys could in any way "foreshadow" for Mr. Agnowski the heartbreak of the close. They don't; and they won't, even if they are explained, even if he takes a note on them. I know I didn't notice them the first time I read the story, and I certainly didn't remember them when I taught the story last. Actually the reader shouldn't notice them since their significance is lost on Aschenbach himself. Leave such things for the *aficionados*. What is important is the impression of the hero's learning and the tragic realization that all his learning cannot, does not, will not protect him from his compulsive folly. From the folly of compulsion which leads him, at fifty, from the Kafkaesque, surrealist Munich street corner by the cemetery with its Wolfean monument works (even here, I am forced to use writers later in time) to a yearning, miasmal death in the most improbable of cities. Mallarmé's white swan imprisoned by the sudden freezing of the fatal pond.

What, it is important to ask, does Mr. Agnowski at twenty know of fifty? Why should he be warned? Well, his father is fifty and he will be fifty. How do you get this across? I don't know. Different times, different ways. There is always something there to use, but the something has to be something immediate. Right there in the present.

As a point of fact the last time I taught "Death in Venice" the neighborhood movies were showing John O'Hara's *Ten North Frederick*, and most of the class had seen it. The hero of that was the late Gary Cooper, who was then almost sixty, but fifty and sixty are miraculously and happily one to twenty, and the hero he played was in imaginative fact fifty. He has an affair with his daughter's friend; there is a highly Victorian and not inappropriate renunciation of the love, and the hero drinks himself to death. It was a far cry from "Death in Venice" as a work of art, but it did deal with the folly of what to students is old age, and since it was a movie all the work had been done for them. They did not have to visualize; they did not have to imagine; they did not have to read. The intelligences of the producer, the director, the actors were all at work

on making the problem clear, and as a point of departure, it served admirably. Of course it can never be used again, but something else will turn up.

There is this to be said about both Miss Eames and Mr. Agnowski: they respect learning. But they respect it for all the wrong reasons. They like their nine points – Miss Eames because she can get them down in her notebook and reproduce them even on what she calls an "essay-type" test, which means that she uses ink instead of an electro-graphic pencil. Mr. Agnowski likes them because he can remember, say, five without reading the story, and then if he can manage to see two or three of Miss Eames, he might get seventeen or eighteen points on the question. I have personally, if not professionally, the greatest sympathy with Mr. Agnowski in this reasoning. Both students need desperately to be disillusioned – Miss Eames in the belief that she knows anything worth knowing, Mr. Agnowski that he has got away with anything worth getting away with. Neither of them knows yet that the great joy of reading comes from discovery, and that no set of "Study Hints," no list of "Questions to Ask Yourself" is ever going to give them joy. As a matter of fact "joy" is the last thing they expect, what they distrust the most.

Do it my way, though, and there is some chance they will come to it. Miss Eames will read the story again to see what she missed; Mr. Agnowski will read it to see what I was talking about, to find out about this guy for himself. And since Mann is far more eloquent than I or any of his critics, their sympathies will be extended, their knowledge broadened, their humanity increased. They may even grasp the reason people read. It will be 1990 before they are Aschenbach's fifty, and God knows what Samuel Beckett will be writing then, but let me tell you a story about the delayed impact of literature. The day President Roosevelt died, I was on a destroyer-escort and the news came in over the radio and there was a pall over the ship and the officers just drifted into the wardroom to be together and the sailors wanted to be together, too, so they just huddled over

the gun mountings or looked toward the wake of the ship from the fantail. All of us had been together a long time and we didn't like each other very much any more and there wasn't anything much to say or do except to sit. Then a sailor—Mr. Agnowski's, Miss Eames' father?—stuck his head in the door and said, "Say, Doc, sir, what's

the name of that poem with all them God damn lilacs in it?"

Why don't you go read "Death in Venice"? The length of time between 1911 and 1990 (the arithmetic is inexorable) is a little longer than the time between "When lilacs last in the doorway bloomed" and the scene in the wardroom I just told you about.

to soften recession's impact and hasten recovery's advent.

Finally, a clutch of analysts have stressed institutional changes within capitalism. Galbraith rested his case upon countervailing power, a sophisticated version of the classical economist's old hope for the diffusion of economic power among many centers. Adolf Berle has identified the corporate conscience—that set of public concerns and public responsibilities which executives have come to accept as limitations upon the single minded pursuit of profit. Excited by the rising number of stockholders, Eric Johnston has trumpeted the emergence of People's Capitalism. The corporate skulduggery which the Chrysler and the General Electric cases have emphasized weakens Berle's pleasant fiction. And stockholders are too small a minority of the population and have too little effect upon the operation of the corporate economy to make Johnston's notion very persuasive.

What does it all mean? Are we safe from major depression? Have the tiger and the ape which Thomas Huxley identified in human behavior been tamed in American capitalists? Has income inequality been so modified as to be tolerable? Has it been modified so much that investment is dangerously discouraged? It is around questions of this variety that Mr. Tsuru's symposium revolves. The contributors include John Strachey and Maurice Dobb of England, Charles O. Bettelheim of France, Yakov A. Kronrod of Russia, and three Americans, Paul Sweezy, Paul Baran, and J. K. Galbraith. Kronrod's piece contains the conventional, tiresome prediction of imminent crisis. Galbraith's essay restates the hypothesis of countervailing power. The interest of the book is to be found in the statements of the remaining contributors. All of them think within a Marxist tradition, although their own positions are personal rather than conventional. Despite differences of emphasis, they agree that capitalism today resembles capitalism yesterday in all important respects. Whatever changes actually did occur in the direction of income equality stopped in the mid-forties. Today as ever private profits are large and they remain within the control of the capitalists. Therefore, soon

Has Capitalism Changed?

by Robert Lekachman

Is American capitalism today significantly different from American capitalism a generation ago? The answer to the question requires a clear notion of what capitalism has been and what capitalism is becoming. Certainly as it displayed itself during the depression and stagnation of the thirties, American capitalism seemed to suffer from a

Has Capitalism Changed?
edited by Shigeto Tsuru
(Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo)

*Managing America's Economic
Explosion*
edited by Dan H. Fenn Jr.
(McGraw-Hill; \$6)

whole collection of damaging defects. Some of the more prominent included a pervasive insecurity of job tenure, inadequate incentives to invest, excessively uneven distribution of income which encouraged excessive saving by the well-to-do, and a discouraging weakness for repetitive sinking spells. Worse still the remedies were obscure. Neither Herbert Hoover's half-hearted application of classical nostrums nor Franklin Roosevelt's muddled and inadequate experiments with the new Keynesian techniques sufficed to cure the twin blights of wasted resources and unemployed men. On the very eve of the Second World War, the unemployed numbered eight or nine million and nothing in the private economy, outside of war itself, offered an impetus strong enough to drive the system toward full employment.

We predict the future out of the consciousness of the immediate past. As

the end of the War approached, therefore, many economists expressed grave forebodings of high unemployment and economic depression in the aftermath of the conflict. To the embarrassment of the prophets and to the glee of their critics, the economy instead surged forward after the briefest of hesitations and no major depression has afflicted us in over twenty years. In comparison to the disasters of the thirties our present unnecessarily high rate of unemployment and our recent failures to grow at satisfactory rates shrink into insignificance.

What does this postwar record prove? Varied voices have proclaimed significant mutation in the capitalist beast itself. While the analysts do not agree upon the reasons for this evolutionary leap, most of them concentrate upon one or more of three themes. The first emphasizes the cluster of innovations which have endowed the American economy with buoyancy, the businessmen with refreshed incentives to invest, and the consumer with new temptations to buy. In chemicals, electronics, synthetic materials, and jet aircraft the pace of change has been rapid enough to identify one of those periods of innovation which the late Joseph Schumpeter defined as the very essence of capitalism itself.

Next there is the altered role of government. At the least the Employment Act of 1946 committed the federal government to high employment as a national policy. Within this benevolent rhetorical framework, it has been possible for both Republican and Democratic Administrations to pursue budgetary and monetary policies designed

or late capitalism will face a crisis. For, if profits are high and capitalists are encouraged to reinvest them, they will have great difficulty in selling the consumer goods which their investment has multiplied. If incomes are distributed more equally and consumers, therefore, are better able to buy, then the reduction in profits which capitalists are allowed to retain will discourage investment and, via multiplier effects, reduce employment and income. The basic contradiction between expanding production and inadequate powers of consumption which Marx identified still serves these socialist economists as a major doctrine.

A nonsocialist may, all the same, derive a degree of encouragement from the socialists. All of these economists appear astonished at the amount of life which lingers in the capitalist carcass. They are notably reluctant to hazard predictions about the date of the transition to socialism. Also they differ among themselves about the role of the state. Paul Sweezy, for example, concedes that "workers may make some gains by political action under capitalism" even though he is convinced that "their true interest can never be served by a system which is built on exploitation and of which unemployment is a normal feature." John Strachey is still more heartening. He believes that democratic pressures have already "profoundly modified" capitalism and that the possibilities for further modification are very substantial.

What have capitalism's defenders to say for themselves? *Managing America's Economic Explosion* is a book constructed from the proceedings of the Harvard Business School's 30th Annual Business Conference. While it includes brief contributions by W. W. Rostow and Leon Keyserling, the heart of the book is contributed by Harvard's own business faculty. It has been said that the Harvard School of Business has much the same relation to the conduct of actual businessmen as Union Theological Seminary has to the conduct of actual Protestants. Certain it is that Harvard takes the responsibilities of businessmen seriously, suffers deeply when businessmen misbehave, and preaches the proposition that the American business manager is the prin-

cipal guardian of the American economy. Undoubtedly the business community would be the worse for the loss of Harvard. It is all the more painful to report, therefore, that the level of reasoning and exposition in this volume is exceedingly low, even to the point of naïveté. The "explosion" of the title is taken for granted. The serious problems of the relation between business and government, and business and society are in the main brushed off with pious platitudes. A single sample will suggest the tone:

"The whole welfare idea in modern

times certainly did not come from the unions; it did not come from the church; and it did not come from government. It came from business itself. The welfare concept started in business and at the highest level—going back to the nineteenth century, chief executives have always been especially well taken care of by the companies."

The debate about the character and prospects of capitalism will continue. It would help if the defense of capitalist enterprise were as intelligently handled as the attack upon it.

A Cook's Tour of the Law Courts

by Alexander M. Bickel

This is an engaging and observant book by a brilliant stylist. It catches the attention, and it is pleasing to the ear. I am sorry to say, however, that I found it pointless.

The book is a travelogue, though a restricted one. Miss Bedford went to see one thing only in the countries she reports on: the manner of the adminis-

The Faces of Justice
by Sybille Bedford
(Simon & Schuster; \$4.50)

tration of justice—with a single exception, the administration of criminal and summary justice. At the start, she puts the English-speaking reader in the picture by means of a tour of the British system. There is a minor criminal trial (somebody embezzled some cheeses), then some episodes of summary justice in magistrates' courts (a drunk, a shop-lifter; also a preliminary hearing for trial in a higher court on a graver offense). This, plus some additional text, sketches in the rudiments of the accusatory Anglo-American system, whose workings, whose failures, and whose essential morality Miss Bedford quite evidently understands and appreciates.

Having thus equipped the reader, Miss Bedford proceeds to her reportage. West Germany gets the most coverage. An "Austrian Interlude" offers some passing comic relief. Swit-

zerland—again some amusement, and a change of pace in a civil litigation. Finally—quite briefly, but very sharp—France: a trial of Algerian terrorists, instances of brutal summary justice, and an insight into the fact that France is pretty much of a police state, and always has been, even if not for "people of reasonable virtue and of reasonable luck" but only *pour les autres*.

It is greatly to Miss Bedford's credit that her book is pointless. It is pointless because, aside from an acute observation here, a compassionate reaction or a decent comment there, Miss Bedford permits herself few judgments and absolutely no comparative generalizations. She is apparently aware that she has not laid the basis for any. It would be nice if a few episodes, seen in the framework of a rudimentary outline of each system, could yield some significant comparative conclusions about the administration of criminal justice in five West European countries. But this cannot be. And Miss Bedford knows it. But then, what is the point of the book?




What is the use of the butterfly? Well, of course, it is. Moreover, it is pretty. It costs nothing to produce it. And it may well have a higher purpose. Miss Bedford's book is more than pretty. It is edifying, for Miss Bedford's values are humane and decent; she is censorious when she observes in-

humanity and pleased at its opposite. Besides, she tacitly conveys the idea that both are possible everywhere, no matter what the system. No doubt. But it is not true that systems and the moral principles they embody don't

really matter. Miss Bedford says no such thing, but some readers may bring it away just the same. And many readers will, in any event, bring away a sense of having been significantly informed. They will not have been, ex-

cept in the slightest fashion, and if they think they have been, they will be worse off than in their previous state of total ignorance. What I mean, I suppose, is simply that this book is unobjectionable as an entertainment.

JULES FEIFFER



IT DOESN'T MATTER NOW. THE
GUY AT THE NEXT TABLE'S
STARTED UP WITH HER. AN ACTOR
TYPE. UNEMPLOYED. HER EX WAS
PROBABLY BOOKISH, SO SHE
OUGHT TO GO FOR THIS. HE
SEEMS OBVIOUS SO SHE
THINKS HE'LL BE EASY
TO HANDLE. WHAT'D I
TELL YOU? HE'S MOVED
TO HER TABLE. SHE'LL
BE VERY DISAPPOINTED.



POOR KID. IF SHE
ONLY KNEW
THAT I WHO
UNDERSTAND
WAS
WAITING
HERE ALL
THE
WHILE.



MOVIES

From Sec Sagan to Syrupy Saga

Anatole Litvak has used the title of a 1933 Broadway success for his film of Françoise Sagan's *Aimez-vous Brahms?*, but the only connection between the first *Goodbye Again* and this one is that Osgood Perkins, who was in the first one, was the father of Anthony Perkins, who is in the second.

Nature has blessed Miss Sagan. She has not been oppressed with huge gifts and a difficult style. The stars in their

Goodbye Again (United Artists)
The Guns of Navarone (Columbia)
The Fabulous World of Jules Verne
 (Embassy)

courses have paused to make her, very nearly from birth, a good minor novelist, French school, with an audience waiting. She has a sense of form and of irony, an insight which is largely candor, and her *locus belli* is the boudoir. She was not a juvenile prodigy; she was simply herself when young.

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Never boring or clumsy, never important, her novels are deft disenchanted entertainments, made to be read.

Litvak can truthfully claim that he has followed her story virtually episode for episode (except for the code-coddling marriage at the end). Samuel Taylor, the screenwriter, has even retained much of her dialogue. It is still the Parisian story of the 40-year-old mistress of a coeval man who is unfaithful to her and somehow courteously neglectful; a woman who succumbs to an infatuated young man (he nearly smothers her with attention and ardor) but who goes back to the older man almost because he is less attentive. She loves him as she never loved the youth; but we feel that she also prefers an occasional lonely weekend to an unending career as mother-in-law.

Though it hews closely to this story, the film's effect is quite different. The style of the original has eluded the film-makers, and the spare landscape of the book is here seen as through a tear-streaked window. By the time the picture has built up sweet suffering in Ingrid Bergman's part so as to provide a haven for homeless Joan Crawford fans, and by the time it has made room for all of Perkins' by-now distasteful posturings, *sec* Sagan has become a syrupy saga.

Miss Bergman has always been a modestly competent, superficial actress whose eupheptic bloom gave her charm and seemed to give her art. Now that the bloom has begun to fade (this is not ungallant; she talks much in this film of her age), we must concentrate on her talent, which does not cut deep. In a great deal of this film, we watch her tears unmoved, and there are a great many tears.

For Perkins we pray—probably hopelessly—for failure. Nothing but several rude shocks, it would seem, will shake this very gifted young actor out of the self-love in which his gifts are now mired. He has labored to create an image of himself as an ungainly appeal-

ing fledgling with a hot soul fluttering in his bony breast. "Now," he appears to be saying, "I'll give 'em that wistful smile I practiced last night." Perkins Fan Clubs of the World, disunite. And give your boy a chance.

Yves Montand is a Frenchman who, in this American film made in Paris, plays a Frenchman and speaks English with a French accent. Somewhere in this tangle he has lost (as in all his American films) the force that once made him an effective actor.

Litvak has directed with commercial competence. During World War II we had "Scotch-type" whiskey. This is a French-type film.

When it doesn't take itself seriously, which it does infrequently, *The Guns of Navarone* is a lively adventure picture—full of vivid action, obviously contrived but effective suspense, photographed on Rhodes in excellent Technicolor. It is the story of six British commandos—headed first by Anthony Quayle and then, after he is hurt, by Gregory Peck—who invade a German-held Greek island in the last war. Their object is to silence two great radar-aimed cannon, heavily protected, which menace a channel through which British destroyers must pass.

Adventure stories of this kind are fundamentally as formal as fugues or sonnets, and this one profits by observing the formalities smartly. There is the urgent deadline, there are fights of many kinds, heroism and treachery, masquerades, mystery, revenge—all touched in tightly by expert technicians. J. Lee Thompson has directed it zestfully, Alan Osbiston has edited it superbly, and Dmitri Tiomkin has supplied a resourceful score. In one of the staple equations of filmdom, Peck still equals Peck, no more, no less. Anthony Quinn hulks effectively as a giant pipe-

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

John Stewart Carter, a professor of English at Chicago Teachers College, will be Fulbright Professor of American Literature at the University of Teheran during the coming academic year. Robert Lekachman is on the economics faculty at Barnard.

smoking partisan, and David Niven is dapper as a don turned demolition expert. Carl Foreman, who produced this two-hour-and-forty-minute film, also made the adaptation from Alastair Maclean's novel and, saving some pronouncements about man's struggle to be free, has whittled it well. In contrast to Sagan, this novel could only be improved by filming because it was a film on paper.

You cannot expect to feel parentally self-sacrificing if you take your children to *The Fabulous World of Jules Verne* because you will probably enjoy it yourself. Imported from Czecho-

slovakia and equipped with adequate English narration, it has been made in a new process called Mystimation. The effect, if not the name, is fetching: as if 19th-Century woodcut illustrations had melted into life—with real actors and cross-hatched Victorian back-grounds. The plot is a ragout of several Verne novels, seasoned with a number of nice touches which will seem satirical to you and marvelously appropriate to young companions. My favorite was the scene where a burly gunner walks along the top of his huge cannon sweeping it off with tidy domesticity before a battle.

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

ART

China Lobby: Treasures from Formosa

The most important exhibition from abroad now in this country is the show of paintings, ceramics, calligraphy and lacquerwork now at the National Gallery of Art in Washington. Lent by the Formosa government from the ancient imperial collections, the material will be on view through August 13. Throughout the next twelve months, it will be seen at the Metropolitan, New York, the Fine Arts Museum, Boston, the Art Institute of Chicago and the De Young Museum, San Francisco. There are observers who doubt the goods will ever get back to Formosa without international trouble, probably originating in the United Nations when the show opens later this year at the Met.

The title is "Chinese Art Treasures" and the show is immediately recognizable as having the quality and scope that any government and people rightly regard as those of "national treasures." Yet the residents of the five American cities to receive the exhibition will get a better look at the stuff than most Chinese ever did. The collection was begun by a Manchu emperor of the 18th Century. The last emperor of China hung on to the collection as a personal treasure long after his retirement in 1912. During the years of his control many fine pieces were given

away. Only in 1925, for the first time in two centuries, was the material placed on somewhat public view in Peking and Nanking. Beginning with the Japanese invasion of the early thirties, the works were crated up and shipped around the country to avoid destruction and capture. Their travels lasted a decade and a half. In 1949 the material was brought to Formosa during the Nationalist evacuation of the mainland. Since then the collection has been housed in a fairly small museum near the center of the island. According to visiting scholars, the Chinese regard the institution's primary mission as the preservation of the finest materials, these are never exhibited. The American show was chosen, in large part, by American museum men from Washington, New York and Boston. The emphasis is on quality and the result, again according to traveler's tales, is a choice incomparably better than material usually displayed at the collection's home base.

We tend to have two views of the two Chinas—seeing on Formosa, on the one hand, a graft-ridden bureaucracy nursing impossible dreams of its own return to full, continental power, and seeing on the other, the mindless masses of the mainland, held in readi-


ness to submerge the West by sheer numbers.

As to the latter, Western scholars report that Communist China is showing an interest in archeology and in the general art of the Chinese past that has not been seen in China since the days of the emperors who began the imperial collection. Highway and hydroelectric projects are turning up substantial finds and it appears to be government policy to preserve everything. At least one American Socialist believes that the whole early art history of China will have to be rewritten on the basis of new materials unearthed by Communist scholarship.

As to the former, the personal histories of the artists represented in this exhibit prove that "graft-ridden bureaucracy" is an ancient Chinese tradition. Many of the painters and many of their philosopher and poet subjects were in the civil service until about the age of 45; then retired to mountain scenery, contemplation, discourse, artistic endeavor and light wines. It sounds ideal and may come closer to the mysterious wisdom of the East

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than any of the Sensationalism we've been having lately. Contemplation, with or without light wines, is certainly the key to Chinese art and life as it appears in the exhibition.

Since about the time the Manchu emperors began this collection, the West has been aware of Chinoiserie, with meanings varying from the 18th Century to the upsurge of interest at the end of the 19th to the present day. Earlier Western epochs had no difficulty in fitting the Chinese spirit into knickknack collections and new, flat ways of painting. Similarly, the present day has no trouble in interpreting all of Oriental art as non-objective and even Action, in the New York sense. The 231 paintings and objects give Chinese art an ample chance to speak for itself; it speedily becomes clear that art was no more non-objective or Actionist than it was knick-knackerish.

It is serene but not austere. The paintings are overwhelmingly concerned with nature more or less raw, but the nature itself never overwhelms. The wildest compilation of mountain, waterfall and undergrowth is all carefully screened in the lines of the painting, ordered gracefully and with no apparent effort. Typically, the most tempestuous kind of wilderness scene is titled something like, "Conversation by the River." Your eye naturally then begins its hunt for the conversation and sure enough, buried away, usually near the bottom, there is a clearing in the mass of rock and vegetation. In the clearing is a summer house; in the summer house two philosophers — retired bureau chiefs — placidly enjoy the view.

Enjoying the view is an important theme. The painting itself often presents an enthralling array of line and subtle color, but almost always, somewhere in the spectacle, and usually on a very small scale, one or more human beings are taking it all in and, presumably, instructing the viewer of the painting in his own function, somewhat like the angels or even kneeling donors in our own late medieval art.

The great exception to this all but universal presence of man on the face of natural beauty is the bamboo painting and the related close-ups of other vegetation and of small birds and animals. The bamboos often look as if the actual shadow of a swaying branch had

fallen upon the paper and miraculously remained there. The substance of bamboo is not attempted; the forms are captured and remain. It takes an effort to realize the audacity of the water color painter in placing his strokes just so and letting them fall.

Most of the paintings are scrolls of one kind or another, either hanging wall scrolls or horizontal hand-scrolls to be unrolled like an early, non-mechanical movie. These are substantial. The wall scrolls are often seven or eight feet high, the handscrolls as much as twenty feet long. This form has clearly had a profound effect on Chinese painting. Composition is almost never as tight, as intricately interrelated in its parts as Western painting. There is presented, rather, an indefinitely continuing segment of reality, in which the viewer's eye and spirit are invited to move gently, never really grasping the whole, but experiencing the changing relations between part A to part B, part B to part C. More than most Western art, the painting creates its own time for the visitor.





Pottery, on the other hand, is often pure form. Occasionally there are highly decorated pieces, but the ceramic weight of the show is form and color. Colors are delicate for the most part and shapes are only rarely the "pure" irreducible geometry of the potter's wheel. At first glance, that geometry seems present, but in most of the pieces it has been given just a touch more of direction. The edges of the bowl flare slightly, to suggest the lotus. As in the paintings, man announces his presence in gentle tones, but it is his presence that rescues nature from her own unconsciousness.

The show, it is said, represents but the scratching of the surface of the vast imperial collections now on Formosa. Yet, in the experience of most American museum visitors, perhaps the most significant aspect of the exhibition is its sheer depth. There are enough significant examples of everything for the visitor to be drawn into the strange world of Chinese art, to learn something of its language and to begin to find its way around in a rewarding field that is rarely seen here in top examples sufficient in number to escape being curiosa.

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Correspondence

Need Progress Be Trouble?

Sirs:

Despite the implications in Asher Brynes' article, "The Trouble of Progress," (NR, May 1), the American Labor movement is fully in accord with the policy of expanded world trade and a liberal import policy for the United States. Mr. Brynes seems to suggest that the views of Mr. Barkin, Mr. Potofsky, and Mr. Darling exert a strong influence in the top councils of the AFL-CIO. We believe that this is an overstatement. They are primarily an aberration in the mainstream of AFL-CIO thinking. The concept expressed in the manifesto of Miami "of safeguarding absolute historic levels of production based upon the recent experience of the particular industry" was sufficiently hedged with qualifications and caveats to make it essentially meaningless in the broad context of AFL-CIO policy.

One of the pillars of that policy is sponsorship of a trade adjustment program designed to facilitate the shift of resources into more productive uses. The Committee for a National Trade Policy also favors such a program. We have little doubt that the AFL-CIO would agree with us that the concept of safeguarding absolute historic levels of production is a sterile and self-defeating one. "Absolute historic levels" in any industry, dynamic or declining, are without significance in a nation and world of rapid economic change. Technological change is inevitable, and in a period such as now it is more rapid than ever.

What the AFL-CIO statement seems to suggest is that unless an effective trade adjustment program is undertaken by the federal government as an essential adjunct of the Trade Agreements Act, the union may be forced by circumstances to modify its traditionally strong support for a liberal trade policy by proposing reservations necessary for internal political reasons.

The Administration would do well not only to take seriously the growing demand for a trade adjustment program on the part of Administration support-

ers in the trade policy field, but to come to a decision as soon as possible that without a trade adjustment program it will be infinitely more difficult to get through Congress the kind of trade policy the times demand.

John W. Hight

Committee for a National
Trade Policy

Washington, D. C.

The CIA and Reasonable Intelligence

Sirs:

While in military service during World War II, I was requested to volunteer for the Office of Strategic Services. I filled out a long questionnaire in duplicate and by hand, had my picture taken, and in due course was ordered to Washington. When I got there it was decided that the war in Europe was too nearly over to enable the OSS to use my services. This was annoying (also avoidable, had reasonable intelligence been used), but nowhere near as annoying as what happened to me when I was returned to the Army: I had to go through basic training all over again.

Always a glutton for punishment, I offered my services to the CIA early during the Korean War. Guess what I received in reply — a civil service application blank.

I'll believe *anything* about our intelligence services.

Frank A. Marx

San Francisco, Calif.

The Mother Tongue

Sirs:

One of your readers on lower Fifth Avenue informs me that in your issue of June 5 I was identified as the author of a novel *The Mother Tongue*, published by the Dial Press last fall. The first part of that statement is correct, but the second is not. *The Mother Tongue* will be published by The Macmillan Company on November 6, 1961. I would be obliged if you would note this correction, so that my five literate relatives in the United States aren't upset by the fact that they haven't yet received a free, inscribed and jiffy-bagged copy of my book.

Anthony Bailey

Chichester, England

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